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We analyze whether banks and industrial companies have equal access to debt markets 
through reputable underwriters and explore the determinants of that matching for both types 
of firms. Using a sample of European corporate bonds during the years 2003-2013, we find 
that the odds of matching with a reputable underwriter were about 1.5 times greater for non-
financial companies than for banks. The odds of matching with a reputable underwriter were 
10.92 times lower for a bank during the crisis. As for the determinants of the matching 
probability, the marginal effect of the bond size on the matching probability is 1.70 larger for 
non-financial firms than for banks. Furthermore, the effect of bond size is greater for large 
non-financial companies than for large banks while the effect of maturity is larger for banks 
than for non-financial companies. 
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The success of a debt issuance offering depends largely on the ability to solve 
information asymmetries in the placement of the issues among investors. This process 
comprises issuers, banks and investors, and goes further than a selling mechanism. Investment 
and commercial banks appointed as underwriters perform research, information production, 
marketing and market stabilization activities, among others.1  
A large body of literature highlights the relevance of underwriters as financial 
intermediaries able to reduce the asymmetric information problems between issuers and 
investors. These information asymmetries turn underwriting into a market for external 
certification services since underwriters provide an enhanced worthwhile external certification 
(Duarte-Silva, 2010). While a certain degree of information asymmetry explains the role of 
underwriters in financial markets, prior literature underlines the twofold role of reputation. 
Seminal theoretical papers emphasize the role of underwriter reputation on capital and debt 
raising, arguing that the reputation of financial intermediaries is able to reduce more 
efficiently the asymmetric information problems between issuers and investors (Beatty and 
Ritter, 1986; Booth and Smith, 1986; Carter and Manaster, 1990; Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 
1994). Furthermore, it has been shown that a reputation acquisition process is generated when 
banks place deals into primary markets. Neupane and Thapa (2013) analyze the investor–
underwriter relationship and show that prestigious underwriters hold strong relations with 
institutional investors. Issuers aim to match with a reputable underwriter and underwriters 
want to place issues from high-quality issuers. A number of studies have agreed on reputation 
                                                          
1 The placement of debt issues in primary markets has changed from the “bought deal” to “best effort”. In the “bought deal” 
method, the bank in charge of the placement commits to buy the bond to afterwards resell it. This method provides greater 
guarantees to the issuer but it adds risk to the bank. The “bought deal” method has progressively lost ground. During 2003 – 
2013 Dealogic reports that 94% of the corporate bonds placed in Europe were made on a “best effort” basis. With this 
method, no additional guarantees are provided to the issuer but the bank in charge of the placement does not act as a mere 
distributor because it also provides certification, screening and marketing. When the “bought deal” was the preferred choice 
in debt markets, the bank in charge of the placement was referred to as “underwriter”. When the placement is made on a “best 
effort” basis the bank managing the placement is the “bookrunner”. Currently, the expression “lead underwriter” and 
“underwriter” are used indistinctly in the U.S., whereas in London “underwriter” continues to be used, although the method 




being relevant to the matching for one of the sides (Benveniste et al., 2003; Drucker and Puri, 
2005; Hoberg, 2007; Kanatas and Qi, 2003; Ljungqvist et al., 2006; Yasuda, 2007), or for 
both sides (Fernando et al,. 2015; Fernando et al., 2012). 
While a number of prior studies have been devoted to assessing the issuer-underwriter 
reputational matching and its main determinants in non-financial deals, the evidence is mostly 
confined to equity deals issued in the U.S. capital markets. This paper investigates the issuer-
reputable underwriter matching process in corporate debt issuance by both banks and 
industrial companies. We address the question of whether banks and industrial companies 
have equal access to external certification through reputable underwriters.  
Although banks are more frequent bond issuers, the corporate finance literature 
focuses on non-financial firms, assuming that banks are not in need of acquiring external 
certification. However, as shown by Hirtle (2006) there are positive price and quantity effects 
for banks when they access external certification. Importantly, the need for external 
certification by banks has been increasing over time and it has been mainly achieved through 
a third-party underwriter rather than by self-underwriting. Hence, excluding banks from the 
analysis – as in most of the earlier studies – implies that a significant portion of the external 
certification market is ignored2. Although we control for self-underwritten deals in our 
regressions, the determinants of self-underwritten deals are not specifically examined in this 
paper as they do not represent the external certification provided by third-party underwriters. 
As being matched with a reputable underwriter determines the final conditions 
obtained on the issuance, a differential access to a reputable underwriter is a matter of 
importance. The superior certification provided by reputable underwriters turns the issue into 
a high-quality external certification. In this sense, Fang (2005) empirically finds that reputable 
banks obtain higher prices (lower yields) for their issuers, concluding that reputable 
                                                          
2 A seminal paper on underwriting by Gande et al. (1999) states that the rationale for excluding financial firms is due to a 
historical reliance on negotiated rather than competitive underwritings for these firms. However, nowadays the investment 
industry has evolved into a more competitive industry, as the changes in league tables reflect. 
4 
 
underwriters are able to offer their clients services of superior quality. In a similar vein, 
Fernando, Gatchev, May, & Megginson, (2015) document the incremental benefits that 
issuers firms receive from high-reputation underwriting. Therefore, due to this superior 
external certification coupled with the higher net proceeds provided, issuers asking for 
external certification – banks and non-banks – would in principle benefit more from external 
certification by matching a reputable underwriter. Moreover, as Chemmanur & Fulghieri 
(1994), Duarte-Silva (2010) and Puri (1996) suggest, all kind of issuers (banks and non-
financial firms) seek certification. 
A large number of studies have underlined the “specialness” of banks in producing 
and handling information in financial markets (Allen and Faulhaber, 1988; Allen and Gale, 
1997; Baron, 1982; Booth and Smith, 1986; Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995; Diamond, 1984, 
1991; Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989; Leland and Pyle, 1977; Welch, 1989). However, banks’ 
informational advantage is related to their ability to assess the creditworthiness of non-
financial firms, while the matching of issuers and underwriters has to do with external 
certification. Differences in opaqueness between banks and non-financial firms may explain 
the need for external certification. As shown by Flannery et al. (2013), banks are not 
qualitatively more opaque than matched nonfinancial firms during normal periods, but they 
are significantly more opaque during crisis periods. This relatively larger opaqueness of banks 
compared to non-financial firms during times of financial stress would suggest that banks 
were less likely to obtain a high-quality external certification during a banking crisis but no 
significant differences should be found in other periods. 
Our analysis relies on a sample of 3,687 corporate bonds issued during 2003-2013. 
Furthermore, we aim to complement a strand of the literature that has investigated the 
determinants of reputable matching by empirically quantifying what characteristics of the 
bond structure and issuer characteristics are the most relevant. From a methodological 
perspective, as in other studies, we use the market share as a proxy for underwriter reputation. 
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However, we take into consideration the growing proportion of syndicate-placed bonds3 and 
build a new measure that more accurately reflects whether a bond is reputably placed in a 
syndicate-placed issue. 
The empirical analysis comprises two main stages. In the first stage, we use 
multivariate logit models to compare the likelihood of non-financial companies and banks 
matching with a reputable underwriter. In the second stage, we analyze and quantify the 
determinants of the matching using logit regressions, and compute their marginal effects.  
By way of preview, we find that the odds of issuing a bond placed by a reputable 
underwriter were about 1.5 times greater for non-financial companies than for banks in 
Europe during the years 2003-2013. Banks and non-financial companies did not have a 
different likelihood of accessing a reputable underwriter in the pre-crisis years. However, a 
lower likelihood of matching a reputable underwriter was observed for banks during the 
subprime period and particularly, the banking crisis period. In this period, the odds of 
matching with a reputable underwriter were 10.92 times lower for banks. 
Regarding bond and issuers’ characteristics, we find that bond size was statistically 
and economically a more relevant factor for non-financial companies while issuer size was 
relatively more relevant for banks. The marginal effect of the bond size on the probability of 
accessing a reputable underwriter was 1.70 larger for non-financial firms than for banks. 
However, the relative weight of issuer size in terms of the marginal effect of bond size is 
larger for banks than for non-financial firms. Furthermore, the effect of bond size on the 
matching probability is greater for large non-financial companies than for large banks, while 
the effect of maturity on the matching probability is greater for banks than for non-financial 
companies, this difference increasing as maturity does. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the extant 
literature. Section 3 develops a theory discussion on banks in debt markets. Section 4 
                                                          
3 Before the year 2000, the average number of underwriters placing a bond in Europe was close to 1. Since the beginning of 
the century this mean has been increasing, which is also confirmed considering the median. Since 2008 the average has 
surpassed 3 underwriters per deal for industrial corporate bonds. 
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describes the dataset. The methodology is explained in Section 5. Section 6 discusses the 
main empirical results. Section 7 concludes. 
2. RELATED LITERATURE 
One strand of the finance literature has linked the functions performed by financial 
intermediaries in capital markets to its reputation. Traditionally, researchers have highlighted 
the certification role performed by underwriters in equity and debts issues, backing the so-
called “certification hypothesis”. This hypothesis argues that underwriters have the skill of 
reducing information asymmetries through their own reputation. Booth and Smith (1986) 
show that opportunist behavior can potentially arise by insiders holding extra information 
about the issue and that underwriter reputation is a mechanism for preventing this behavior. 
Beatty and Ritter (1986) argue that the certification role is enforced when reputation is at 
stake because banks do not have incentives to cheat. According to this role, when 
underwriters price issues in the capital markets they do so certifying issuers. Underwriters 
have incentives to maintain their reputational capital as bad future performance can damage 
their reputation, negatively affecting their business volume. Lead underwriters are concerned 
to maintain their reputation, and reputation acts as a signal for the market (Carter and 
Manaster, 1990). The reputational capital of these banks explains why they certify the 
intrinsic value of the issue. In this sense, Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) point out that 
reputable underwriters reduce the information asymmetries present in financial markets more 
effectively because they implement standards to evaluate issuers in order to reduce the 
likelihood of poor performances in the future.  
These theoretical predictions have been confirmed to some extent in empirical studies 
examining equity IPOs and corporate bond issuance. Dong et al. (2011) use a sample of 7,407 
IPOs from 1980 to 2006 to show that deals placed by reputable underwriters predict a better 
long-run performance. Besides, IPOs with higher underwriter reputation are shown to 
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outperform IPOs with less reputable underwriters. Using a sample of 2,449 industrial bonds, 
Livingston and Miller (2000) conclude that reputation certifies the value of a bond issue to 
investors.  
 In the most specific study on debt issues, Fang (2005) provides empirical evidence on 
certification. Reputable underwriters are found to obtain higher prices (lower yields) for their 
issuers. 
More recently, some studies have suggested a shift from the certification role to a 
“market power hypothesis”. Chemmanur and Krishnan (2012) maintain that, as highly 
reputable underwriters with larger market shares are capable of attracting large institutional 
investors, they have the incentive to maximize the issue valuation instead of certifying its 
intrinsic value. In particular, they show that IPOs placed by more reputable underwriters are 
priced higher than their intrinsic values. Andres et al., (2014) provide evidence of higher 
downgrade and default risk in high-yield bonds placed by reputable underwriters.  
The extant studies that have used a matching model to study the issuer-underwriter 
relationship have chiefly contemplated the underwriter’s reputation – as well as the existence 
of previous and concurrent credit relationships – as driving forces of choice. In this context, 
the general conclusion is that previous credit relationships positively affect the probability of 
being chosen as underwriter in future issues because the establishment of a relationship 
allows the underwriter bank to generate a valuable asset that is referred to as “relationship 
specific capital” (Bharath et al., 2007; Drucker and Puri, 2005; Duarte-Silva, 2010; G. 
Kanatas and Qi, 1998; Ljungqvist et al., 2006). 
Traditionally, the models used have been solely based on the choice made by one of 
the counterparts (Drucker and Puri, 2005; Hoberg, 2007; Ljungqvist et al., 2006; Yasuda, 
2005, 2007). In these models, the issuer chooses from among a range of underwriters that are 
willing to place the issue. However, Fernando et al. (2005) consider matching a mutual 
choice. In their model, the underwriter screens the issuer’s quality and at the same the issuer 
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tries to identify the ability of the underwriter to place the issue. As a result of the mutual 
screening there is a positive assortative selection in which high-quality issuers match with 
reputable underwriters induced by reputation. Furthermore, the probability of the continuity 
of this selection decreases as the difference between issuer quality and underwriter reputation 
increases.  
This positive assortative selection leads us to consider not just a simple issuer-
underwriter matching but a reputable matching. Generally, this strand of literature has 
provided empirical evidence on the (deal-level and issuer-level) determinants of the reputable 
matching, highlighting that deal size and issuer size are particularly relevant (Andres et al., 
2014; Cao et al., 2014; Dong et al., 2011; Fang, 2005; Fernando et al. 2005;Lee and Masulis, 
2011; Loureiro, 2010; Neupane and Thapa, 2013). To the best of our knowledge, there is no 
empirical evidence about these determinants for banking corporate bonds.  
Consistent with the role of reputation in the matching models, a number of studies 
have tried to explain what triggers the changing of underwriters for subsequent offerings as 
switching models. Krigman et al. (2001) study the reasons that lead issuers to switch to a new 
underwriter in successive equity issues, concluding that issuers do not change because they 
are displeased with a past issue’s features. Rather, they seek reputable underwriters able to 
offer them a better quality service (“graduation hypothesis”). Fernando et al. (2005) show that 
firms will be more likely to switch underwriter as the difference between the new issuer’s 
reputation and the reputation of the previous underwriter increases, confirming the positive 
assortative matching (“transaction-based hypothesis”). McKenzie and Takaoka (2013) find 
that the issuer and the most recent lead underwriter’s reputation – along with issuers’ current 
relationships – affect the switching choice in the Japanese bond market.  
Another set of studies has further examined the ex-post value that arises from 
engaging with a reputable bank in an attempt to explain why issuers prefer highly reputable 
underwriters. This preference is likely to be explained by the better long-run performance of 
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those issuers that raise capital though prestigious underwriters (Carter et al., 1998; Dong et 
al., 2011). Furthermore, Neupane and Thapa (2013) show that prestigious underwriters hold 
strong relations with institutional investors while less prestigious underwriters mainly deal 
with non-institutional investors. Burch et al., (2005) conclude that there is created value for 
those companies matched with reputable underwriters, although it depends on the type of 
issuance, while Fernando et al., (2012) highlight that the created value for firms is higher if 
the underwriter helps them to go public compared to issuing debt securities. 
3. WHAT MAKES BANKS SPECIAL? 
3.1 Banks in an external certification market 
 Baron & Holmstrom (1980) suggest that the main reason for using a third-party 
underwriter is the existence of an implicit demand for certification among investors. Unlike 
non-financial firms, banks have the option to self-underwrite but this does not naturally 
provide them with the necessary certification. Issuers – banks and non-financial firms – could 
reduce information asymmetries by disclosing information that signals their quality. However, 
signaling does not entail certification. If information opaqueness increases, external 
certification is mainly obtained through a third-party underwriter (Hirtle, 2006).  
A number of earlier studies seem to assume that banks are not in need of certification because 
they have better access to capital and debt markets than non-financial firms. However, this is 
not consistent with the larger frequency of third-party placements compared to self-
underwriting in recent years4. Figure I describes underwriting as a market for external 
certification.  
3.2 Banks in debt markets 
Seminal theoretical contributions on financial intermediation depict a situation in 
which banks, as financial intermediaries operating in financial markets, are better informed 
                                                          
4 According to Dealogic just 25% of the banks bonds proceeds were self-issued during 2003-2013, while 75% were 
underwritten by third parties. 
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than non-banks (Allen and Faulhaber, 1988; Baron, 1982; Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989; Rock, 
1986; Welch, 1989). According to Fama (1985) this competitive advantage is due to their 
ability to process and handle information. Furthermore, the theory on certification highlights 
banks’ role in certifying issuers’ quality in the presence of information asymmetries (Booth 
and Smith, 1986; Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994). Unlike non-financial firms, banks are 
specialized financial intermediaries since they produce information as market participants. 
Furthermore, even assuming a certifying ability of non-financial firms, only financial 
institutions are legally allowed to provide underwriting services in capital markets. Hence, 
unlike non-financial firms, the double role that banks can play in the markets as both issuers 
(clients of underwriting services) and underwriters (suppliers of underwriting services) 
coupled with they better knowledge of the market and its rules should be considered. These 
differences extend to other related markets. For example, Sufi (2007) explores the syndicate 
loan market and finds that issuers that have repeated access to the market face fewer 
information asymmetries – because lead arrangers should hold less of the loan. Similarly, 
Cocco et al. (2009) also find that relationships are an important determinant of banks’ access 
to the interbank market. 
As for the comparison of banks relative to non-financial firms, it has been argued that 
the former are more opaque than the latter (Morgan, 2002). Flannery et al. (2013) conclude 
that banks are not qualitatively more opaque than matched non-financial firms during normal 
periods, but they are more opaque only during crises. 
3.3 Why banks may match differently with reputable underwriters? 
Theoretical models explain the value of external certification based on informational 
asymmetries between firms and investors (Baron, 1982; Baron & Holmstrom, 1980; Rock, 
1986). Similarly, the issuer-underwriting matching is affected by asymmetries between 
issuers and underwriters when the former are in need of certification (Cao et al., 2014; Fang, 
2005; Fernando, Gatchev, & Spindt, 2005; Yasuda, 2005). The role of reputation in the 
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certification market is twofold. On one hand, reputable underwriters are believed to reduce 
these information asymmetries more efficiently as credible certifiers (Beatty and Ritter, 1986; 
Booth and Smith, 1986; Carter and Manaster, 1990; Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994).  On 
the other hand, reputable banks put their reputation as certifiers at stake when they underwrite 
an issue. The reputational concern of high reputable underwriters will hinder the matching 
with other banks facing greater asymmetries, which are comparatively less transparent and 
more opaque issuers.  
Therefore, a differentiated matching – a lower likelihood of obtaining a high-quality 
external certification – would be consistent with banks or non-financial firms facing 
comparatively greater informational asymmetries. The matching problem is even more acute 
in the case of banks as they are likely to compete in both the intermediation and the 
underwriting/issuing business. Specifically, as opaqueness increases, there are fewer 
incentives to share reputational problems with rivals.  
According to earlier studies, banks, compared to non-financial firms, do not show 
larger informational asymmetries (opacity) in good times but seem to be more opaque during 
financial turmoil. This would trigger reputable underwriters to certify a lower proportion of 
underwriting mandates for banks than for non-financial firms. 
Our approach is based on examining both banks and non-financial firms as bond 
issuers in a reputable framework, excluding banks’ self-issued deals in order to focus on 
third-party placements. For comparability reasons, we employ fixed corporate bonds, sold in 
the same primary market and issued by both banks or non-financial firms. 
3.4.  The determinants of the matching probability 
While prior literature explore the main determinants of the matching between issuers 
and underwriters for non-financial deals, bank bonds remain unexplored. Given the 
abovementioned differences between non-financial firms and banks, our baseline hypothesis 
would be that the determinants of the matching for non-financial firms could have a different 
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impact compared to banks. In trying to explore that hypothesis, we follow earlier studies and 
make a distinction between deal-level characteristics and issuer-level characteristics. 
Theoretical and empirical investigations on equity and debt issues, summarized in Table V, 
have yielded some relevant evidence that we discuss in the following sub-sections.  
3.4.1. Bond-level determinants: Placement Complexity 
Some studies suggest that specific features of bond placement may increase or 
decrease the likelihood of matching a reputable underwriter. We focus on the main features of 
the design – volume of the proceeds raised and bond maturity – as proxies of placement 
complexity (Fang, 2005; Fernando et al., 2015; Lou and Vasvari, 2013; Song, 2004) . Prior 
studies show that more complex bonds are more likely to be placed by reputable underwriters 
(Andres et al., 2014; Fernando et al., 2015; Loureiro, 2010; McKenzie and Takaoka, 2013). 
Higher investor demand for reputable players coupled with higher capabilities in the 
development of these activities, lead issuers to choose more reputable underwriters when they 
want to place complex bonds (Chemmanur and Krishnan, 2012; Neupane and Thapa, 2013). 
In particular, placement complexity increases with bond size as underwriters must exert 
greater effort in marketing, pricing and selling. Additionally, the relationship between 
maturity and risk means that long-term bonds entail higher complexity on being brought to 
market. Hence, bonds aiming at large proceeds and with longer maturities are considered 
more complex to underwrite.  
Although some empirical studies have considered that callability might be related to 
placement complexity (Fang, 2005; Livingston, and Miller, 2000) due to the reinvestment risk 
for bond buyers, the decision to include a call option is also related to information 
asymmetries (Banko and Zhou, 2010; Chen et al., 2010; Choi et al., 2013; Robbins and 
Schatzberg, 1986). Signaling theory highlights that including a call feature serves as a signal 
of issuers’ quality in the presence of asymmetric information. Furthermore, Fernando et al., 
(2005) consider the existence of a positive qualitative matching between issuers and 
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underwriters. Consequently, the relationship between callabillity and the reputable matching 
is not necessarily explained by complexity. Information asymmetries could bias the choice of 
issuing these bonds. 
3.4.2.  Issuer-level determinants: First-time issuer  
Supporting the certification hypothesis, prior studies find that issuers’ lack of 
experience is negatively related to the probability of a reputable matching (Andres, et al., 
2014; Cao et al., 2014; Fang, 2005; Fernando et al., 2005; Yasuda, 2005). Reputable 
underwriters are less likely to place a bond of a relatively inexperienced issuer, thus putting 
their reputation at stake. Lack of experience issuing debt securities increases uncertainty about 
the bond issuer and the bond performance.  
In financial markets, intermediaries are more frequent markets participants compared 
to non-financial firms. Unlike non-financial firms, a more intense day-to-day market 
participation might help banks to outweigh their lack of experience on the particular fixed 
bond market. In this sense, Kollo & Sharpe, (2006) examines bond spreads for financial and 
non-financials and find that new financial issuers are not charged higher underwriter spreads, 
suggesting greater information asymmetries for new non-financial issuers. Consequently, we 
would expect the probability of matching a reputable underwriter to be more negatively 
affected by lack of experience in the case of non-financial firms. Similarly to Andres et al. 
(2014) and Gande et al., (1999), we employ the dummy variable “first-time issuer” that takes 
the value 1 if the issuer had not issued any corporate bond over the last 15 years (from 1988) 
before the sample begins in order to explore this hypothesis. 
Along with experience, other concurrent performance indicators should be considered 
to compare the reputable matching probability of banks and non-financial firms. One might 
argue that banks are subject to greater regulatory scrutiny but, in fact, market discipline 
applies to both types of issuers. Besides, any differences in the effects of performance or 
solvency indicators may reveal some institutional advantage (due to regulatory or market 
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differences), which is worth investigating in any case. Issuers’ leverage, ROA and total assets 
are included to control for the level of indebtedness, profitability and issuer size (as in, for 
example, (Cao et al., 2014; Fang, 2005; Fernando et al., 2005; Fernando et al., 2015; Lou and 
Vasvari, 2013; Loureiro, 2010).  
4. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
4.1 Measuring Underwriter Reputation 
Some previous studies measure reputation by looking at the position that the 
underwriter has in the tombstone announcement that goes with an issue (Burch et al., 2005; 
Carter and Manaster, 1990; Kirkulak and Davis, 2005; Logue et al., 2002; Suzuki, 2010). The 
rationale behind this way of accounting for reputation is that underwriting banks are not 
placed in random positions but strategically to signal reputation. However, the difficulty that 
is entailed in collecting these tombstones for corporate bonds and the diminishing volume of 
them have played against their use as an indicator of reputation.  
There are also measures based on market opinion surveys. According to Roden and 
Bassler (1996), market opinions do not necessarily provide better reputation measures than 
tombstone-based indicators.  
Most of the literature has considered that market share is an accurate proxy for 
reputation in the underwriting business. Highly reputable underwriters should be those with 
greater market shares because reputation attracts more underwriting contracts. Two main 
measures have been built from market share information: cardinal and ordinal. A cardinal 
measure considers the market share as a continuous variable (Esho et al., 2006; Gande et al., 
1997; Iannotta and Navone, 2008; Livingston and Miller, 2000; Megginson and Weiss, 1991; 
Roten and Mullineaux, 2002; Schenone, 2004) Alternatively, ordinal measures classify or 
rank underwriters according to their market share, considering only the top underwriters as 
reputable (Andres et al., 2014; Esho et al., 2006; Fang, 2005; Livingston and Miller, 2000; 
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McCahery and Schwienbacher, 2010; Narayanan et al., 2006; Narayanan et al., 2004; Ross, 
2010; Yasuda, 2005).  
We opt for an ordinal measure. As Fang (2005) argues, this way the market structure 
is encompassed best because banks in capital markets are commonly seen either as 
heavyweight players or not. We consider as reputable those underwriters ranked in the top 7 
in the annual underwriter leagues, as shown in Tables I and II using the rankings of Dealogic 
Debt Capital Markets5. The cut is not arbitrary but motivated by several reasons. The 
European fixed corporate bond market is less concentrated than that of the United States. The 
top-3 ranking is mostly used in the U.S. but in Europe there are no big differences in terms of 
market shares between the first-ranked banks in the underwriter league tables6. Furthermore, 
during the period covered, the seventh underwriter annually presented a market share of 
around 5%, whereas the eighth fell quite below this share. In addition to this, the top 7 
underwriters participated annually, as sole underwriter or in a syndicate, in more than 50% of 
deals7. One possible option could have been to select the main seven banks as reputable, as in 
Fang (2005). However, some underwriters that were reputable in the debt markets at the 
beginning of the sample period were not at the end. 
Sole underwriter deals are easy to classify using the league tables but when a 
syndicate has placed the bond, there are different alternatives. Traditionally, those who have 
discretized the market share have considered a deal as reputably underwritten if at least one of 
the underwriters is at the top of the selected ranking (Andres et al., 2014; Cao et al., 2014; 
Fang, 2005; Fernando et al., 2005). As syndicate deals are common in Europe, the chance of 
considering a bond as reputably underwritten following such a criterion increases. It is highly 
                                                          
5 Leagues have been built using as deal underwriters those considered as underwriter parents. Our rationale for considering 
underwriter parents is that debt financial markets are dominated by large banks. Although their subsidiaries sometimes carry 
out underwriting services, the esteem and reputation that influence the matching and signal quality arise from the parent bank 
that backs the subsidiary. As per Kollo (2005), taking underwriter parents reflects the multinational nature of the market. 
However, for purposes of robustness we have also built reputation measures using league tables by underwriter subsidiaries. 
6 The similar market share covered by the top 3 underwriters reported in Andres et al. (2014) for high-yield corporate bonds 
in the United States and for the top 7 in the European market – 39.3% for the top 3 in the United States and 43.17% for the 
top 7 in Europe – suggests that extending the reputation some places is a need not a whim. 
7 This group is basically formed by Deutsche Bank, RBS, JPMorgan, Citi, BNP Paribas, HSBC and Barclays. Only three 
banks other than the ones cited – SG Corporate & Investment Banking, Credit Suisse and Bank of America Merrill Lynch – 
have entered this group in recent years. 
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likely that bonds with more underwriters will be considered reputable if just one of those 
underwriters is reputable. A much stricter option is to consider a deal as reputable only if all 
underwriters in the syndicate belong to the top 7. However, using this criterion a syndicated 
deal can be considered as not reputable just because one underwriter is not in the top 7 even if 
the rest of them are. We opt for a more balanced option. We compute the market share that 
the syndicate would have had if all the banks participating in it had merged. We refer to this 
indicator as the "Syndicate Market Share" (SMK). A deal is considered as reputable if the 
average SMK is higher than the market share held by the seventh underwriter in the annual 
league tables. This also solves to some extent the problem of how the underwriter league 
tables are built, splitting all the proceeds equally among all the underwriters when there are 
more than one8. The calculation of the SMK is as follows: 
𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 (𝑆𝑀𝐾)  =
∑ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑠 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑛 𝐵𝐾𝑖𝑗
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑠 𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑗
 𝑥 100 
n = number of underwriters in a deal                                               j= 2003, . . . , 2013 
Nevertheless, we have built other variables as robustness checks to ensure that the 
main results do not hinge upon comparing the top annual seven underwriters with the rest. 
These robustness checks are based on choosing underwriter subsidiaries instead of 
underwriter parents. 
Finally, a distinctive feature of the banking corporate bonds that must be taken into 
account is the fact that banks can underwrite their own issues. The treatment of the so-called 
self-funded deals is relevant in order to compute the banks’ market shares as underwriters. In 
this sense, the reasoning behind using the market share as proxy measure of reputation 
justifies the decision to exclude self-funded deals in the underwriters’ market share 
computation. The market share of a specific underwriter will empirically capture its reputation 
only if this market share reflects the real volume of business performed for third parties. In 
                                                          
8 This construction of the underwriter league tables is also done in Abrahamson et al., (2011); Aggarwal et al., (2002); 
Migliorati and Vismara (2014) for IPOs rankings. 
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this sense, underwriter league tables and regression analyses for banking corporate bonds are 
built and estimated excluding self-funded deals. 
4.2. Database construction and variables 
Data on original fixed non-perpetual corporate bonds issued in European countries are 
collected from the Dealogic Debt Capital Markets database. This database includes details of 
the bond issue, including yield, maturity, offer price, coupon, deal underwriter, rating, etc. 
The sample period goes from January 1, 2003 to January 1, 2014, thereby covering the pre-
crisis and crisis years. Our database comprises two kinds of corporate bonds: industrial bonds 
– whose issuers are companies different from utilities and regulated firms (SIC: 4000s) and 
financial firms (SIC: 6000s) – and banking bonds. We exclude deals with missing values for 
at least one tranche in the underwriter parent and issue rating at launch.  
In order to control for issuer characteristics we matched the Dealogic dataset with the 
information provided about the issuer by Compustat Global9 (for industrial firms) and 
Bankscope-Bureau Van Dijk (for banks)10. Therefore, our sample is a matched database that 
includes deal characteristics (provided by Dealogic) and issuer characteristics (provided by 
Compustat Global and Bankscope). The sample includes 3,687 corporate bonds (1,490 
industrial and 2,197 banking bonds) issued by 716 companies in 22 European countries11 
representing a total of $2,924,462 million. The yearly distribution of the deals is shown in 
Figure II. 
Dealogic provides information at a tranche level and a deal level for multiple tranche 
bonds. We follow a deal-level approach. The main reason is that the mandate contract agreed 
by issuer and underwriter is mainly done at deal level. Underwriters agree on providing their 
services even if there is more than one tranche. When underwriter/s and issuer discuss 
                                                          
9 Compustat Global provides financial information for publicly traded companies covering around 90% of world market 
capitalization. As most corporate bonds are issued by public companies, using this dataset does not reduce the potential of 
our research. 
10 Furthermore, if we had used Compustat we would not have considered all those deals carried out by savings banks and 
cooperative banks – which constitute a significant part of the financial systems of Spain (“cajas de ahorros”), Italy (“casse di 
risparmio”) and Germany (“sparkassen”). 
11 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom. 
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together the issuance characteristics they also discuss tranching as a credit enhancement 
technique. Provided that the negotiation is done at the same moment and is included in a 
mandate contract, underwriters do not differ between tranches. While the proceeds, maturity 
and yield can vary within a deal, there is a single contract and underwriters are chosen 
collectively, not independently. Additionally, a deal-level approach means dealing with 
multiple tranches that have to be computed on a deal basis12.  
We have classified the variables into three different categories: issue characteristics, 
issuer characteristics and underwriter characteristics. Summary statistics are offered for the 
whole sample distinguishing between non-financial and bank corporate bonds. With regard to 
the main deal characteristics, the average issue volume in our full sample is $764.36 million 
with a mean maturity of 6.35 years. Non-financial corporate bond deals are brought to market 
by an average number of 3.20 underwriters per bond, which is in line with the 3.14 figure 
shown in Andres et al. (2014) for high-yield industrial bonds. However, in banking deals this 
average number is lower (2.19 underwriters/deal) suggesting that non-financial companies are 
more inclined to underwrite contracts with a syndicate of underwriters. Lastly, the large 
number of different underwriters merits special attention13. 
This unique sample, which contains detailed information about the bond terms and 
issuers – industrial firms and banks – and accounts for measuring reputation in syndicated-
placed deals, represents largely the European debt markets. Therefore, it constitutes an 
appropriate empirical laboratory to draw conclusions about the access of industrial firms and 
banks to the debt markets via a reputable underwriter. 
5.  METHODOLOGY  
                                                          
12 In those cases in which there are more than one tranche we compute weighted averages for our variables at the deal level, 
weighting each tranche by its tranche value proceeds. In our sample 88% of the deals are one-tranche deals. For robustness 
purposes we have re-run our model excluding tranched issuances, obtaining similar results, which are available upon request. 
13 More than 80 underwriters provide their services in all different kinds of issue. This fact reflects the high number of 
participants in the underwriting market although it has been said that not all of them play the same role. While so many of 
them do not attain at least 1% of market share, the great investment and commercial banks are those that underwrite both the 
most deals and the most voluminous deals. 
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5.1. Benchmark model on the matching probability for non-financial and bank 
bonds 
Do banks and industrial companies have equal access to reputable underwriters in debt 
markets? The empirical strategy for addressing this question consists in estimating a binary 
choice model capable of explaining the probability of matching a reputable underwriter. 
Following previous studies, the estimation of the matching equation depends on variables that 
reflect issuer and bond characteristics. We use a logit model to test differences in issuer-
reputable underwriter matching probability, accounting for deal and issuer features. The logit 
model employed is expressed as follows14: 
 
E(Y |X = x) = (Pr(𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑈𝑊 = 1| X ) =  Λ (𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑋𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠  
+ 𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑟 𝑓𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑅
′𝑆 𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸 +  ∑ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟ℎ
ℎ
ℎ=1
+ ∑ 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑘
𝑘
𝑘=1
+ 𝑒𝑖 ) 
 (1) 
in which 𝑋𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠 is a vector of variables reflecting the deal’s features and 
𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑟 𝑓𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠 is a vector of variables containing the characteristics of the issuer firm. We 
include year dummies in all regressions to control for the chance of variations in debt 
financing over time. We also control for the nationality of the deal including country 
dummies in our regressions. Our main variable is a dummy controlling for the kind of issuer, 
being 1 if the issuer is a non-financial company. Bond features are especially important in 
terms of assessing the bond risk and thus how it affects its placement in the primary market. 
The natural logarithm of the deal proceeds is used as proxy of the bond size. The complexity 
of the marketing, pricing and selling activities increases with bond size. As for the maturity, 
the relationship between maturity and risk results in long-term bonds entailing greater 
complexity when they are brought into market. Therefore it can be expected that these long-
                                                          
14 The link function of the logit model is an S-shaped or sigmoid function whose domain is between 0 and 1 (essential for a 
binary choice model). This model is estimated using the Maximum Likelihood Method. 
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term bonds are likely to be underwritten by reputable underwriters. A dummy for callable 
bonds is also considered. Issuers will be highly likely to call a bond if the market interest rates 
have declined, allowing them to create a new issue at a lower rate. In this context, investors 
would have to reinvest in a less favorable environment. We also include a dummy for 
investment grade bonds in order to control for bond quality. We account for multiple-tranche 
deals, adding the number of tranches forming a bond. Lastly, we control for the syndicate 
size. Regarding issuer characteristics, consistent with previous studies, company size is 
proxied by the natural logarithm of the total assets of the company at the end of the year 
before the issue. In order to assess how the financial structure of the company influences the 
matching between issuers and underwriters we have included a firm leverage measure: the 
debt to equity ratio. Profitability is also accounted for by the Return on Assets (ROA)15. We 
control for bonds issued by a special purpose company or finance vehicle16 dependent on their 
issuer parent. As abovementioned issuers’ asymmetries matter, so we consider issuer 
experience in issuing corporate bonds with a dummy taking the value 1 if the issuer has not 
issued any corporate bond since 1988. 
In order to test how banks were affected in terms of the reputable matching during the 
crisis, we have split the sample period initially into two sub-sample periods: pre-crisis and 
crisis. Given the particular features of the European case, we have further divided the crisis 
period into three sub-periods following the time division employed in Prokopczuk et al., 
(2013): subprime crisis, banking crisis and sovereign debt crisis.17 
5.2. Determinants of the matching and their impact on the probability 
After testing differences in access to a reputable underwriter depending on the 
financial or non-financial nature of the issuer, we focus on which bond and issuer 
                                                          
15 As in other studies, all the balance sheet values were collected at the end of the year before the issuance. 
16 A finance vehicle is a company that operates as the cash pooling and treasury vehicle in financial markets issuing capital 
market instruments, such as commercial paper, medium-term notes, and long-term bonds. 
17 The subprime crisis started in July 2007 until the Lehman Brothers collapse became a fact on September 30, 2008. This 
period is referred to as the subprime crisis because it is when the subprime mortgages became unpaid in the United States. 
The next sub-sample period took place up until the end of June 2010. This is the so-called banking crisis. Finally, from July 
2010 onwards the period is named the European sovereign crisis. 
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characteristics have a higher weight in the matching distinguishing by banks and non-
financial issuers. The sample is split into bonds issued by non-financial companies and banks. 
We have also used a logit model because, in the case of a univariate discrete choice model, 
both probit and logit produce similar results18. Additionally, the magnitude of features that 
have an impact on the matching cannot be done estimating a joint model with all the variables 
and their interactions because the interpretation of these coefficients and computing the 
marginal effects entails a higher degree of complexity in non-linear models, as the literature 
has recognized (Ai and Norton, 2003; Berry et al., 2010; Brambor et al., 2006)19. This 
complexity cannot be solved choosing a logit model (Norton et al., 2004). We test whether the 
magnitude of the coefficients differs across groups (non-banks and banks) rather than across 
models. Therefore, we have separately estimated and computed two marginal effects for non-
financial and banking corporate bonds: marginal effects at means (MEM) and average 
marginal effects (AME). 
6.  RESULTS 
6.1. Banks and industrial companies’ access to a reputable underwriter 
Table VI offers some descriptive statistics comparing non-financial companies and 
bank bonds and then all of them together. T-statistics are included to test the difference in 
means. The Wilcoxon rank sum statistic is used to test the difference in medians. Overall, 
these tests reveal that bonds placed by reputable underwriters are significantly different from 
those placed by less reputable underwriters in several aspects. The results provided in this 
table are consistent with the prior literature on capital and debt issues. 
According to mean- and median-difference tests, more reputable underwriters appear 
to place bonds with larger proceeds and longer maturity. A call option, which might increase 
                                                          
18 Nonetheless, we have tested in unreported regressions that our results are robust after using the probit function as link 
function. 
19 Prior literature has highlighted that interaction terms in non-linear models are confusing to and misinterpreted by applied 
researchers. In this sense, a t-test cannot infer the statistical significance of the coefficient of the interaction effect. 
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the complexity of placing the bond, does not appear to be differently used in bonds placed by 
reputable or less reputable underwriters. Additionally, more reputable underwriters in our 
sample charge lower fees than the less reputable in industrial bonds, consistent with the 
differences found in Fang (2005)20 for industrial bonds. Deals placed by reputable 
underwriters offer higher yields, which is in line with issuing bonds with longer maturity. 
Issuer size – in terms both of market capitalization and of total assets – appears to be larger 
for deals placed by more reputable underwriters in the case of bank bonds.  
The odds ratios of the logit regressions are reported in Table VII. Models 1 and 2 refer 
to non-financial and bank bonds whereas Models 3 to 5 are the baseline models for the whole 
sample. The findings suggest that large proceeds and longer maturity bonds are more likely to 
be issued by reputable underwriters. Furthermore, after controlling for other issuer 
characteristics such as profitability, leverage and experience in the markets, firm size is 
positive and statistically significant for both industrial and bank issues. The results suggest 
that compared to banks, non-financial companies have a higher likelihood of matching a 
reputable underwriter. The odds of issuing a bond placed by a reputable underwriter are about 
1.50 times greater for non-financial companies than for banks after controlling for bond and 
issuer characteristics.  
 6.2. Access to a reputable underwriter: Pre-crisis vs. crisis period 
Table VIII shows univariate statistics for pre-crisis and crisis periods, including mean 
and median tests for differences between reputable and non-reputable underwriters. Bonds 
were greater in size during the crisis. There was also an increase in the syndicate size, 
suggesting that underwriters were reluctant to bear alone all the risks of placing an issue in a 
climate of high uncertainty and information asymmetries. The effect of the economic 
                                                          
20 Unlike Andres et al. (2014), who report that issues underwritten by reputable underwriters are not integrated by a large 
number of underwriters. These conflicting results are due to differences in the reputation measure used. As their criterion is 
based on finding at least one reputable underwriter within a deal, it is logical that syndicates formed by more underwriters are 
more likely to include at least one reputable underwriter. We have also obtained the same result as them in unreported 
statistics using their criterion. Building the average market share of all the underwriters in a deal and ranking it in the league 
tables allows us to mend this fact that overestimates reputation in a deal and explains why different results appear in practice. 
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deterioration is also observable in bond ratings, which on average were downgraded one point 
(18.75 "A+" vs. 17.49 "A"). Compared to the pre-crisis period, bonds placed by reputable 
underwriters during the crisis corresponded to larger, less leveraged and more profitable 
firms. This suggests that during the crisis, access to a reputable underwriter was more 
stringent for smaller firms.  
Table VII shows the estimation results for the logit models before and during the 
crisis. There is no empirical evidence of differences in the probability of matching with a 
reputable underwriter between banks and non-financial companies in the pre-crisis period. 
However, during the financial crisis there is empirical evidence that banks faced more 
difficulties in the matching process compared to non-financial companies. Each column of 
Table IX, corresponding to a separate regression, reports the odds ratios for the sub-sample 
periods. During the subprime crisis and banking crisis periods their access to reputable 
underwriters was particularly affected. The odds of matching with a reputable underwriter 
were about 10.92 times lower for banks than for non-financial companies during the banking 
crisis. These results reflect that in this period banks were more vulnerable in terms of 
accessing external certification through reputable underwriters compared to non-financial 
companies. 
6.3. The determinants of the matching probability 
We investigate the determinant differences in the effects of deal and issuer features on 
the matching with reputable versus less reputable underwriters using logit multivariate 
regressions for non-financial issuers and banks.  
Table X reports the logit estimation results for non-financial issuers. Different models 
are presented depending on the set of controls used: years, deal nationality and industry 
dummies21. As expected, the probability of matching with a reputable underwriter increases 
with bond size. This finding is quite robust across all specifications. Bonds with longer 
                                                          
21 Similar results are obtained in unreported regressions for subperiod dummies instead of year dummies. 
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maturities are found more likely to be placed by reputable underwriters. The effect of callable 
bonds is not clear because it has a positive effect only at a 10% level of statistical significance 
before controlling for the nationality of the deal22. Furthermore, we find that first-time issuers 
are negatively related with the probability of matching a reputable underwriter, which 
suggests that newcomers face difficulties in allocating their deals. The evidence also suggests 
that more reputable underwriters place deals of bigger firms after controlling for issuers’ 
industry and deal nationality. Leveraged firms, in terms of debt to equity ratio, are less likely 
to match with a reputable underwriter. Finally, bonds issued by finance vehicles, linked to 
their parent, are less likely to be placed by a reputable underwriter. 
The same bond and issuer factors are also analyzed for banking companies in Table X. 
Large proceeds and longer maturity bonds are also more likely to be placed by reputable 
underwriters in the case of bank issuers. Therefore, these results are in line with the argument 
that reputable underwriters place complex bonds no matter the kind of issuer. The negative 
and significant coefficient for callable bonds suggests these bonds are less likely to be placed 
by a reputable underwriter in the case of bank issues. Some additional results are worth 
mentioning. In contrast with the findings on industrial firms, a bank being a first-time issuer 
does not affect the likelihood of engaging in a reputable relationship. These results would be 
in line with non-financial firms being more negatively affected by informational asymmetries. 
Finally, we find that banking corporate bonds issued by finance vehicles are more likely to be 
placed by a reputable underwriter but only at 10%; this result suggests that assigning the 
function of issuing capital market instruments to a specialized finance vehicle may favor the 
reputable matching in the case of banks. 
 6.4. Economic significance 
Overall, comparing the determinants of Tables X we find that bond size, maturity and 
firm size are common determinants of the reputable matching for non-financial companies 
                                                          
22 Anyway, as Fang, (2005) argues, the increasing complexity of placing bonds with a call option supports the fact that they 
are more likely to be underwritten by reputable underwriters. 
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and banks but differences appear on callable and first-issuer bonds. The non-statistically 
significant coefficient for industrial callable bonds after controlling for time, deal nationality 
and industries suggest that the relationship between callabillity and the reputable matching 
might not necessarily be driven by complexity. However, the negative and significant 
coefficient for banking bonds shows that reputable underwriters are less likely to place 
callable bonds. Additionally, the negative and significant coefficient of first-time issuers for 
industrial firms compared with the non-statistically significant of this variable for banking 
bonds suggest that the lack of experience issuing debt securities puts more placement 
difficulties on non-financial firms. In this sense, the coverage and repeated participation of 
banks in capital markets may outweigh the uncertainty of a first issuance for them. 
We quantify the economic significance of these matching determinants by computing 
marginal effects at means (MEM) and average marginal effects (AME). Table XI reports the 
marginal effects as well as the statistical differences between industrial and bank issues. In 
this table, marginal effects are computed for the more robust specifications after controlling 
for time, deal nationality and industries.  
We find that a 1% increase in the bond size from its mean value increases matching 
probability by 13.6 percentage points for non-financial issues and 8% for bank issues. These 
results suggest that bond size has a relatively higher weight in the matching for non-financial 
firms compared to banks, as the marginal effect of the bond size on the probability of 
accessing a reputable underwriter is 1.70 larger for non-financial firms than for banks. As 
Figure III shows, this difference is non-monotonic. At the low 5th size percentile the 1% 
increase marginal effect is the same for banks and non-financial issues (around 3.67 
percentage points). However, as bond size increases, the marginal effects for non-financial 
companies augment rapidly while for banks the increment is marginal. 
With regard to issuer size, a 1% increase in the total assets from its mean value 
increases the probability of matching by 5.95 percentage points for non-financial companies 
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and 4.75 points for banks. Figure III summarizes these results. Comparing the marginal 
effects of bond and issuer size for non-financial firms and banks, we find that at their median 
values the bond size effect is 2.17 times larger than the issuer size effect for non-financial 
firms while this ratio is just 1.64 times larger for banks. Therefore, the weight of the issuer 
size effect in terms of the marginal effect of bond size is larger for banks than for non-
financial firms. Finally, we find that on average a 1% increase in the maturity increases the 
probability by 7.22 percentage points for non-financial bonds and 8.85 points for banking 
bonds. Therefore, the marginal effect of the maturity on the probability is 1.15 times larger for 
banks than for non-financial firms at means. The effect of maturity on the matching 
probability is greater for large banks than for large non-financial companies. These results 
suggest that firms’ ability to adapt their bond design agreeing on longer maturities is 
significantly more important for banks than for non-financial companies.  
6.5. Robustness 
To check the robustness of our results we rerun the empirical tests to consider a range 
of factors that could potentially affect the findings. Our primary concern is to ensure that our 
results have not been driven by the possibility that some industrial companies and banks 
decided to issue corporate bonds because they had financial urgencies during crisis years, 
when access to interbank and equity markets was largely restricted. We have re-estimated our 
baseline model on the subsample of bonds of firms that issued at least once in both periods: 
pre-crisis and crisis period. Table XII reports the estimation results for these regressions. The 
findings are similar to those of Tables VII and IX. We find that, compared to non-financial 
companies, European banks encountered more difficulties in accessing a reputable 
underwriter, in particular during the banking crisis years. In this sub-sample, the odds of 
issuing a reputably placed bond continue to be greater (1.53 points) for non-financial 
companies than for banks between 2003 and 2013, with the lowest likelihood arising in the 
matching for banks during the subprime and banking crisis.  
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Another set of robustness checks refers to the measurement of reputation. One aspect 
that could affect the validity of our result is computing reputation on underwriter parents 
instead of the underwriter subsidiaries. Consistent with parent-level results, we find 
unreported results qualitatively and quantitatively similar. 
Additionally, one difficulty that entails comparing reputation across countries is the 
presence of domestic issuances for which national underwriters may be more reputable than 
for large international issuances23. In this sense, domestic bonds, underwritten by domestic 
banks and in the home market, have sharply decreased. Kollo (2005) reports that, in Europe, 
domestic bonds were at 62% before the adoption of the euro, whereas during 1999 – 2005, 
according to Lau and Yu (2010), they were at 34%. In our sample, 370 bonds out of 3,687 are 
domestic bonds (10% of the sample)24. In order to alleviate this concern, in unreported 
regressions available upon request, we have re-estimated our model separating between non-
domestic bonds, Eurobonds and bonds issued in core European economies. The results 
obtained confirm that the odds of matching with a reputable underwriter were greater for non-
financial companies than for banks during the sample period. 
As banks may perform a double role as issuers and underwriters, we test whether 
banks that performed both roles had a differential matching with industrial firms compared to 
those banks that act only as issuers. First, we estimate the matching equation for banks that 
annually issued debt but did not act as underwriters – pure bank issuers. Then, we consider 
those banks that annually performed both roles – bank issuers & underwriters. Finally, as 
some banks could have performed both roles simultaneously only occasionally, we estimate 
the model excluding the banks with an annual underwriting market share smaller than 0.5%25. 
                                                          
23 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this issue. 
24 Following Migliorati and Vismara, (2014) we have computed a national ranking of underwriters for the core European 
economies (Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italy and Spain) for non-financial and bank deals during our research period. 
These league tables show that although some underwriters change their positions depending on the specific market, there is a 
clear presence of “bulge bracket banks” in the European underwriting industry. Furthermore, while during our research 
period commercial banks entered the underwriting industry, these banks, mainly domestic banks, only had a presence in their 
home market but without reaching the top positions, as the league tables reveal. 
25 We consider this threshold, a market share larger than 0.5%, because during 2003 – 2013 underwriting a single mandate in 
a specific year does not provide an annual market share larger than 0.5%. 
28 
 
The results of these regressions are reported in Table XIII. They are consistent with our prior 
findings. Both sub-samples of banks – pure bank issuers and bank issuers & underwriters – 
are less likely to match a reputable underwriter during the crisis compared to non-financial 
firms. 
It could occur that banks may follow a pecking order in issuing debt depending on 
their own reputation as underwriters26. We control for this by including a variable in the 
regression that controls for the reputation of banks as underwriters. In particular, we add a 
dummy that takes the value 1 if the issuer bank is a Top 7 underwriter along with a variable 
showing the market share of the bank in the market for underwriting. As shown in Table XIV, 
reputable banks are more likely to match a reputable underwriter, which is consistent with the 
positive assortative matching. 
We also account for the fact that self-underwriting coupled with banks’ reputation 
might drive the matching. Then, an interaction term between self-underwriting and banks’ 
reputation as underwriters (Self-underwriter*bank reputation) is introduced. Table XV shows 
that banks’ reputation continues to be statistically significant while self-underwriting does not 
seem to explain the matching. The interaction term is not significant. In unreported 
regressions, available upon request, we have considered all the bonds issued by banks during 
the sample period – self-underwritten and third-party underwritten – to explain the 
relationship between self-underwriting and bank reputation27. As expected, we find that most 
reputable underwriters do not self-underwrite. Reputable banks are more likely to ask for 
external certification during the crisis. 
Supplemental robustness regressions including extra controls are conducted. In these 
additional regressions we aim to account for some additional deal and issuer features in order 
to ensure that the main results do not hinge upon omitting variables. As additional controls we 
                                                          
26 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this issue. 
27Pr(𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓 − 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒 = 1| X ) =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑟 𝑓𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 +
 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑒𝑖  
Bank reputation is proxied using bank’s market shares as underwriter 
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consider other bond characteristics (floated coupon, bond purpose, currencies and placement 
conditions), other issuer features (past issuer, public bank, self & not-self), and underwriting 
industry conditions (simultaneity). 
Floated coupon is a dummy variable that controls for those bonds that have a variable 
rate. The currency in which the bond is fully issued is also considered to control for the 
exchange rate risk. SEC and Rule 144A variables are dummies referring to placement 
conditions that the bond issuance could fulfill mainly linked to registration rights. The 
inclusion of Rule 144A does not mean that the bond is traded in the U.S.; but it would mean 
that the bond offering is available to the public in the European country of registration and 
that it would also be a private placement to qualified American institutional buyers.  
With regard to the issuer characteristics, we have controlled for their nature. Issuer 
experience in capital markets can also be tested by including a dummy for past issuers in the 
previous 15 years before the sample period started. A positive sign is expected for non-
financial companies’ bonds in contrast to the negative sign presented in our baseline 
regressions for newcomers to capital markets. Finally, the public bank issuer dummy is 
reported for banking bonds if the issuer is not a private bank. This variable is included to 
reflect the bank’s ownership28. Additionally, we control for self-funded deals including the 
variable Self&NotSelf, a dummy that takes the value 1 if the bank has in the same year issued 
bonds that it has placed by itself and other bonds that have been placed by third parties. This 
way we control for those issuers that chose to follow both alternatives in the same natural 
year. Lastly, some variables that are likely to reflect the market conditions of the issue date 
are included. In particular, Simultaneity reflects whether the European capital markets were 
hot at the issue date, in order to show that issuing in a “hot market” does not alter or affect the 
match. Additionally, we consider two alternative time windows centered on the issue date: 30 
and 90 days.  
                                                          
28 The traditional distinction between commercial and investment banks is less relevant since in Europe most of the banks 
perform activities that belong to both kinds of banking. 
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 Table XVI reports the odds ratios of these regressions with extra controls. The results 
show that our results are robust to the inclusion of these additional control variables. Banks 
had more stringent access to reputable underwriters during the financial crisis, especially in 
the banking crisis period, after considering additional control variables. The statistical 
significance does not change when new variables are added into the regression. Bond size, 
maturity, total issue, first-issuer bonds and firm size are statistically significant in the different 
regressions. Table XVII presents the results for industrial and banking corporate bonds. It is 
worthwhile mentioning that past issuer is positive and statistically significant for non-
financial companies, as more experience in capital markets seems to affect the matching 
positively. Furthermore, floated coupon bonds are less likely to be placed by reputable 
underwriters. And finally, bonds under Rule 144A are more likely to be placed by a reputable 
underwriter, which is expected because these bonds face fewer information asymmetries due 
to the registration requirements that they have to fulfill. In regard to banking, corporate bond 
results do not vary. It is noticeable that the indicator variable for public banks is not 
significant while the dummy controlling for banks that have placed by themselves and in a 
syndicate during the same year is positive but not significant. 
7.  CONCLUSIONS 
This paper investigates, for the first time, the issuer-reputable underwriter matching 
process in corporate debt issuance by both banks and industrial companies.  
 We employ a combined dataset of corporate bonds issued in Europe during 2003–
2013 by banks and non-financial companies. We find that banks had a lower probability of 
matching with a reputable underwriter compared to non-financial companies over the sample 
period. The lower likelihood for banks arose during the subprime and banking crisis in which 
the odds of matching with a reputable underwriter were about 5.02 and 10.92 times lower for 
banks respectively. However, no differences are found before the crisis. 
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Our results also suggest that bond size and issuer size matter in the reputable 
matching. Bonds with large proceeds issued by large issuers are more likely to be placed by 
reputable underwriters. While bond size has a greater effect on the matching probability for 
non-financial companies, bank size is relatively more decisive for banks. The marginal effect 
of the bond size on the probability of accessing a reputable underwriter is 1.70 larger for non-
financial firms than for banks while this difference is not observed on issuer size. The relative 
weight of issuer size effect in terms of the bond size effect is larger for banks than for non-
financial firms. The effect of bond size on the matching probability increases, as size does 
more for industrial firms than for banks. Furthermore, the effect of maturity on the matching 
probability was greater for large banks than for large non-financial companies, this difference 
increasing as maturity does. 
These results have policy implications and suggest new research avenues. Further 
research in this area could bring a better understanding of the information asymmetries that 
could affect banks as clients in the underwriting business. As the final conditions obtained on 
debt issuance depend on underwriter reputation, larger difficulties for banks in matching with 
a reputable underwriter hinder the consolidation of debt markets in Europe. Policies focused 
on improving market transparency and progress in the articulation of a common market 
framework in Europe would reduce the presence of information asymmetries, thereby 
favoring the consolidation of these markets and resulting in benefits for all kinds of issuers in 
Europe. 
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ANNUAL TOP 10 UNDERWRITER PARENTS MARKET SHARE RANKINGS IN THE EUROPEAN FIXED CORPORATE BOND MARKET.  
NON-FINANCIAL COMPANIES BONDS (2003-2013) 
Rank  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
1 Deutsche Bank Deutsche Bank BNP Paribas Deutsche Bank Deutsche Bank RBS Deutsche Bank Deutsche Bank Deutsche Bank HSBC Deutsche Bank 
2 Citi BNP Paribas Citi Barclays Citi Deutsche Bank RBS Barclays Citi Barclays HSBC 
3 JPMorgan JP Morgan Credit Suisse JPMorgan HSBC BNP Paribas BNP Paribas BNP Paribas RBS RBS BNP Paribas 
4 BNP Paribas Citi HSBC Morgan Stanley JPMorgan HSBC SG Corporate  RBS BNP Paribas Deutsche Bank Barclays 
5 HSBC Barclays Deutsche Bank BNP Paribas BNP Paribas JPMorgan HSBC HSBC Barclays BNP Paribas JPMorgan 
6 RBS Credit Suisse SG Corporate Citi RBS Barclays Barclays 
BofA Merrill 
Lynch 
JPMorgan JPMorgan RBS 
7 Barclays ABN AMRO ABN AMRO RBS Barclays SG Corporate  JPMorgan Citi SG Corporate  Citi Citi 
8 Goldman Sachs Goldman Sachs JPMorgan HSBC SG Corporate Goldman Sachs Citi SG Corporate  
BofA Merrill 
Lynch 
SG Corporate  
BofA Merrill 
Lynch 
9 Credit Suisse HSBC Barclays ABN AMRO Morgan Stanley Calyon Calyon JPMorgan HSBC Goldman Sachs Goldman Sachs 








SG Corporate  
TABLE II 
ANNUAL TOP 10 UNDERWRITER PARENTS MARKET SHARE RANKINGS IN THE EUROPEAN FIXED CORPORATE BOND MARKET. 
BANKING BONDS (excluded self-funded deals) (2003-2013) 
Rank 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
1 UBS UBS UBS Deustche Bank Deutsche Bank RBS Barclays Barclays HSBC BNP Paribas Deutsche Bank 
2 Credit Suisse ING Calyon UBS Barclays BNP Paribas HSBC HSBC BNP Paribas Natixis HSBC 
3 Barclays RBS Deutsche Bank ABN AMRO Credit Suisse HSBC RBS RBS Barclays JPMorgan Goldman Sachs 
4 RBS Deutsche Bank ABN AMRO Barclays Calyon Barclays BofA Merrill Lynch BNP Paribas Goldman Sachs Barclays JPMorgan 
5 Deutsche Bank Credit Suisse BNP Paribas BNP Paribas BNP Paribas Deutsche Bank UBS Deutsche Bank BofA Merrill Lynch Deutsche Bank Barclays 
6 ABN AMRO JP Morgan Credit Suisse Calyon JPMorgan Calyon BNP Paribas BofA Merrill Lynch Deutsche Bank BofA Merrill Lynch BNP Paribas 
7 BNP Paribas Fortis UniCredit Credit Suisse UBS UBS JPMorgan JPMorgan RBS Goldman Sachs BofA Merrill Lynch 
8 West LB Citi JPMorgan UniCredit UniCredit SG Corporate Deutsche Bank Credit Suisse JPMorgan HSBC Credit Agricole 
9 HSBC ABN AMRO Rabobank Rabobank Rabobank Banca IMI Credit Suisse SG Corporate Credit Suisse Citi Citi 





SAMPLE SUMMARY STATISTICS 
This table presents the summary statistics (mean and median) for the main variables in the sample dataset. The t-
test values are based on two tails t-test for difference in means between the two groups of corporate bonds and 
Wilcoxom Mann-Whitney test is used for medians. *, **, *** Different is significant at less than 10 %, 5%, 1% 
level. 
  Corporate bonds Tests 
 
 
All Non-financial Banking T- test 
Wilcoxom 
Mann - Whitney 
Proceeds ($ mill) 
Mean 764.36 782.21 752.79 
0.98 8.37*** 
Median 446.72 551.81 343.95 
Maturity (years) 
Mean 6.35 7.04 5.90 
7.96*** 14.34*** 
Median 5 6.06 5 
Yield (%) 
Mean 4.56 4.78 4.41 
4.64*** 8.45*** 
Median 4.19 4.55 3.96 
Coupon (%) 
Mean 4.54 4.75 4.41 
4.83*** 7.89*** 
Median 4.20 4.50 4 
Gross Fees Spread (%) 
Mean 0.76 0.59 0.85 
-7.88*** -5.79*** 
Median 0.45 0.35 0.66 
Effective Rating at Launch 
Mean 17.91 15.41 19.37 
-36.28*** -33.12*** 
Median 19 15 20 
Number of Underwriters 
Mean 2.59 3.20 2.19 
18.61*** 19.46*** 
Median 2 3 2 
Callable  % 12.26% 22.26% 5.77% 14.01*** 15.19*** 
Collateralized % 1.15% 2.26% 0.43% 4.50*** 5.19*** 
Private Placement % 7.61% 6.84% 8.01% -1.45 -1.43 
Euro Placement % 74.02% 77.64% 71.48% 4.55*** 4.45*** 
SEC % 3.26% 5.44% 1.83% 5.43*** 5.97*** 
Rule 144A % 7.68% 11.96% 4.91% 7.42*** 7.99*** 
Issuer / Originator number 716 437 279   
Issuer / Originator Parents number 476 345 131   
Underwriters number 146 90 146   
Nationality number 22 20 20   
Deals n 3,687 1,490 2,197   
Tranches n 4,343 1,874 2,469   
 
TABLE IV 
DISTRIBUTION OF UNDERWRITERS IN THE SAMPLE 
This table presents the number and percentage of sole and multiple deals in the sample by kind of corporate 
bond. 
 
Non-financial issues Banking issues 
Sole underwriter 210 14.09% 907 41.29% 
2 Underwriters 422 28.32% 575 26.17% 
3 Underwriters 294 19.73% 252 11.47% 
4 Underwriters 292 19.60% 286 13.02% 
5 Underwriters 133 8.93% 142 6.46% 
> 5 Underwriters 139 9.33% 35 1.59% 
Total 1,490 deals 2,197 deals 
 
FIGURE II 
DEALS AND PROCEEDS VOLUME ISSUED IN THE SAMPLE (2003 -20013) 
These graphs plot the number of bonds and the volume of proceeds issued into the primary capital 
markets in the sample. The left-hand side graph is referred to the number of bonds while the right-hand 































EMPIRICAL PAPERS' RESULTS IN THE ISSUER-UNDERWRITER MATCHING 
This table presents the main empirical findings in the issuer-underwriter matching in the prior literature for equity and debt issues.  
Variables Sign Empirical Papers Proxy used Dummy 
Firm Size + 
Fang (2005) Market value 
 
Fernando, Gatchev and Spindt (2005) Log (Market capitalization value) 
 
Fernando et al., (2015) Log (Market capitalization value) 
 
Loureiro (2010) Log (Total Assets) 
 
Cao et al., (2014) Log (Market capitalization value) 
 
Lou and Vasvari (2013) Log (Total Assets) & Log (Total Assets)2 
 
Issue Size + 
Fernando et al., (2005) Log (proceeds) 
 
Fernando et al., (2015)  Log (proceeds) 
 
Andres et al., (2014) Log (proceeds) 
 
Loureiro (2010) Log (proceeds) 
 
Benveniste et al., (2003) Log (proceeds) 
 
Chen, Shi and Xu, (2013) Log (proceeds) 
 
Maturity + Fang (2005) Log (Years) 
 
Callable + / Non-significant 
Fang (2005) Callable Dummy 
Andres et al., (2014)  Redeemable Dummy 
Firm Profitability - / Non-significant 
Fang (2005) ROA 
 
Fernando, Gatchev and Spindt (2005) Earnings / Dividend Dummy 
Fernando et al., (2015) ROA 
 
Firm Leverage - Lou and Vasvari (2013) Long-term debt to total assets & Leverage2 
 
Deal Rating + 
Fang (2005) Investment Grade Dummy 
Fernando, Gatchev and Spindt (2005) Investment Grade Dummy 
Andres et al., (2014) BB / B Dummy 
Collateralized - / Non-significant Andres et al., (2014) Unsecured Dummy 
Experience + 
Fang (2005) Frequency 
 
Fernando, Gatchev and Spindt (2005) Log (years since foundation) 
 
Andres et al., (2014) First time issuer Dummy 
Cao et al., (2014) Past High reputable underwrite Dummy 
Volatility / Risk. - / Non-significant 
Fang (2005) Sigma (Issuer's stock volatility) 
 
Fernando, Gatchev and Spindt (2005) Standard error of daily returns after the offer 
 
Andres et al., (2014) Beta 
 
Cao et al., (2014) Std. of market excess return over past year 
 
Cao et al., (2014) Market volatility 
 
Benveniste et al., (2003) Uncertainty (Expected price variation ) 
 
Number of forecast + Fernando, Gatchev and Spindt (2005) Log (nº of forecast) 
 
Venture backed firm + 
Fernando, Gatchev and Spindt (2005) Venture backed company Dummy 
Loureiro (2010) Venture backed company Dummy 
Benveniste et al., (2003) Venture backed company Dummy 
Public Firm + Andres et al., (2014) Public firm Dummy 
Rule 144A Non-significant Andres et al., (2014) Rule 144A Dummy 
High Yield Index + Andres et al., (2014)  High Yield Index 
 
Protection of Shareholders Rights - Loureiro (2010) Protection of shareholders rights Dummy 
Book Equity to Market Relation + Cao et al., (2014) Book equity value / Mkt. capitalization 
 
Auditor + / Non-significant 
Lou and Vasvari (2013) Reputable auditor Dummy 




UNIVARIATE STATISTICS BY UNDERWRITER REPUTATION 
This table reports the descriptive statistics non-financial and banking corporate bonds in Europe by underwriter reputation during 2003 - 2013. Mean and median values are reported for deals underwritten by 
more reputable underwriters and less reputable underwriters. We consider a deal underwritten by a reputable underwriter if the underwriter or the syndicate is included in the top 7 of underwriter table leagues 
provided annually by Dealogic Capital Market according to the market share. Otherwise, the bond is reported as less reputable underwritten. We have reported variables that refer specifically to the bond, the 
issuer and the underwriter. We use two tails t-test for difference in means between the two groups of corporate bonds and Wilcoxom Mann-Whitney test is used for medians. *, **, *** Different is significant 
at less than 10%, 5%, 1% level. 
 
NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATE BONDS BANK CORPORATE BONDS 
 
Reputable Underwriter Less Reputable Underwriter t-test z-test Reputable Underwriter Less Reputable Underwriter t-test z-test 
Bond characteristics Mean Median Mean Median t -value z-value Mean Median Mean Median t - value z - value 
Issue Size ($ mill) 947.11 673.06 693.10 476.77 -5.22*** -7.18*** 814.41 373.64 721.96 329.31 -2.02** -3.69*** 
Maturity (years) 8.05 7.00 6.49 5.71 -5.75*** -6.66*** 6.97 5.00 5.36 4.58 -8.74*** -10.94*** 
Yield (%) 5.24 5.00 4.53 4.28 -6.47*** -7.26*** 4.42 4.18 4.41 3.85 -0.14 -2.04** 
Coupon (%) 5.16 5.00 4.53 4.25 -6.04*** -6.90*** 4.48 4.25 4.37 3.87 -1.11 -2.32** 
Offer Price (%) 99.80 99.69 99.94 99.86 1.14 5.86*** 100.06 99.99 100.05 99.98 -0.18 -0.62 
Effective rating launch 15.55 15.00 15.32 15.00 -1.24 -1.11 19.46 20.00 19.33 20.00 -1.20 -0.76 
Gross Fee Spread 0.45 0.33 0.67 0.37 4.80*** 2.56** 0.92 0.75 0.80 0.48 -2.72*** -4.05*** 
Number of Underwriters 2.94 3.00 3.34 3.00 4.73*** 2.16** 1.76 1.00 2.40 2.00 12.17*** 10.25*** 
Number of Tranches 1.34 1.00 1.21 1.00 -3.42*** -3.56*** 1.15 1.00 1.15 1.00 -0.14 0.24 
Past Issuer 0.57 1.00 0.42 0.00 -5.58*** -5.53*** 0.74 1.00 0.64 1.00 -5.05*** -4.88*** 
First Time Issuer 0.21 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.20 0.20 0.05 0.00 0.09 0.00 2.90*** 2.71*** 
Investment Grade 0.87 1.00 0.82 1.00 -3.00*** -2.87*** 0.97 1.00 0.97 1.00 0.63 0.65 
Callable 0.24 0.00 0.21 0.00 -1.21 -1.23 0.05 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.91 0.88 
Collateralized 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.73 0.70 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.23 0.23 
Finance Vehicle Issuer 0.38 0.00 0.43 0.00 1.82* 1.81* 0.11 0.00 0.05 0.00 -4.79*** -5.33*** 
Private Placement 0.08 0.00 0.06 0.00 -1.01 -1.04 0.04 0.00 0.10 0.00 5.46*** 4.79*** 
Euro Placement 0.84 1.00 0.75 1.00 -4.33*** -4.10*** 0.71 1.00 0.72 1.00 0.51 0.51 
SEC 0.07 0.00 0.05 0.00 -1.42 -1.49 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.00 -4.05*** -5.04*** 
Rule 144A 0.15 0.00 0.10 0.00 -2.52** -2.64*** 0.06 0.00 0.04 0.00 -1.74* -1.83* 
Issuer characteristics Mean Median Mean Median t -value z-value Mean Median Mean Median t - value z - value 
Total Assets ($ bill) 55.46 31.63 71.90 36.04 4.10*** 1.38 952.33 635.65 574.16 458.73 -10.16*** -7.41*** 
Total Liabilities ($ bill) 35.34 20.99 47.24 22.71 4.57*** 1.55 921.91 621.51 547.73 444.33 -10.40*** -7.62*** 
Total Equity ($ bill) 13.72 5.69 15.64 5.69 1.49 0.04 37.14 27.00 26.77 15.97 -6.71*** -5.47*** 
Leverage (TL/TA) 0.66 0.65 0.66 0.65 -0.19 -0.02 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.38*** -7.19*** 
Debt Equity ratio (TL/TE) 0.01 1.97 2.54 1.85 1.14 0.11 590.68 24.36 0.44 20.02 -0.49 -8.01*** 
Net Income ($ bill) 3.29 1.03 3.93 1.02 1.95* -0.28 3.16 1.60 1.43 0.83 -8.32*** -7.72*** 
ROA (%) 4.75 4.15 4.20 3.87 -2.03** -2.05** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -3.53*** -1.19 
ROE (%) 13.71 13.52 13.00 13.48 -0.29 -1.68* 0.09 0.09 0.14 0.07 0.90 -7.54*** 
Market Capitalization Value ($ bill) 41.17 16.59 42.29 17.30 0.37 -0.78 51.52 46.18 27.72 17.28 -8.66*** -9.77*** 
Issuer Rating 15.50 15.00 15.36 15.00 -0.76 -0.76 19.30 19.67 18.76 19.00 -4.59*** -5.65*** 
Issuer Frequency 12.23 6.00 17.82 8.00 5.11*** 2.01** 98.58 34.00 130.55 33.00 4.45*** -1.05 
Issuer Parent Frequency 15.90 10.00 24.32 10.00 6.03*** 1.37 132.05 73.00 151.13 54.00 2.76*** -4.16*** 
Underwriter characteristics Mean Median Mean Median t -value z-value Mean Median Mean Median t - value z - value 
Average UW Market Share 7.63 7.17 3.45 3.85 -42.13*** -31.26*** 7.08 6.45 2.61 2.82 -55.11*** -38.25*** 
Market Share Worst Reputable UW 5.23 5.33 1.47 1.06 -29.96*** -26.30*** 6.05 6.03 1.36 0.87 -43.88*** -34.08*** 




PROBABILITY OF REPUTABLE MATCHING:2003-2013 (ODDS RATIO) 
This table presents the odds ratio and the z-statistics for the logit regressions for non-financial and banking corporate bonds issued in Europe during 2003 - 2013. The dependent variable is a binary 
variable that takes the value 1 if the bond is placed by a reputable underwriter. Issue size is the natural logarithm of the bond proceeds. The maturity variable is the natural logarithm of bond's 
years to mature. Callability is a dummy for bonds with a call option. The investment grade variable is a dummy taking the value 1 for Investment Grade bonds. Number of tranches reflects the 
tranches forming a deal. Total issue is the natural logarithm of the sum of relative issue sizes during the sample period. First issuer is a variable taking the value 1 if the bond is the first bond issued 
by the issuer in the last 15 years. The variable firm size is the natural logarithm of the issuer’s total assets. ROA is computed as the return on assets based on the net incomes and total assets. Debt 
equity is a ratio of total liabilities to total equity. Syndicate size reflects the number of deal underwriters. Finance vehicle is a variable taking the value 1 if the issuer is a finance vehicle company. 
The dummy variable INDUSTRIAL is a dummy taking the value 1 if the issuer is a non-bank company. *, **, *** Coefficients are statistically significant different than zero at least at 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels.  
 I 
Non- financial corporate bonds 
II ALL 
VARIABLES Corporate Bonds 2003-2013 Precrisis Crisis 
      
Issue Size 1.918*** 1.502*** 1.581*** 1.570*** 1.746*** 
 (0.204) (0.104) (0.0882) (0.111) (0.130) 
Maturity 1.568*** 1.735*** 1.806*** 1.535*** 1.914*** 
 (0.273) (0.216) (0.206) (0.188) (0.253) 
Callability 1.308 0.554** 1.014 1.139 1.156 
 (0.273) (0.158) (0.158) (0.192) (0.191) 
Investment Grade 0.960 0.371* 0.797 1.013 0.886 
 (0.244) (0.196) (0.174) (0.232) (0.202) 
Nº Tranches 1.037 0.736** 0.963 1.039 0.944 
 (0.104) (0.112) (0.0585) (0.0742) (0.0724) 
Total Issue 0.715** 0.882 0.841** 0.871* 0.753*** 
 (0.0970) (0.0747) (0.0615) (0.0680) (0.0743) 
First Issuer 0.569*** 0.792 0.664** 0.631** 0.588*** 
 (0.123) (0.214) (0.113) (0.120) (0.115) 
Firm Size 1.329** 1.273** 1.120 0.988 1.239** 
 (0.171) (0.151) (0.0924) (0.0887) (0.124) 
ROA 0.978 1.193e+11 0.978 0.985 0.971 
 (0.0158) (2.941e+12) (0.0221) (0.0174) (0.0203) 
Debt to Equity 0.996*** 1.000 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000** 
 (0.00112) (7.74e-06) (4.40e-06) (3.35e-06) (9.88e-06) 
Syndicate Size 0.730*** 0.648*** 0.715*** 0.810*** 0.689*** 
 (0.0424) (0.0806) (0.0490) (0.0483) (0.0442) 
Finance Vehicle 0.670** 3.223* 0.744 0.619** 0.695 
 (0.136) (1.980) (0.199) (0.145) (0.182) 
INDUSTRIAL   1.504* 1.172 2.102** 
   (0.361) (0.331) (0.616) 
Constant 0.00265*** 0.0131*** 0.0136*** 0.0249*** 0.00464*** 
 (0.00267) (0.0151) (0.00932) (0.0177) (0.00403) 
      
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industries Yes - - - - 
Countries Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard Errors Cluster Issuer Cluster Issuer Cluster Issuer Cluster Issuer Cluster Issuer 
Pseudo R2 0.2469 0.2220 0.1828 0.1586 0.2231 
Log-Likelihood -726.7436 -1074.348 -1918.3611 -1249.8936 -1408.1241 
p-value (chi2)) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 




UNIVARIATE STATISTICS BY ISSUE DATE: PRECRISIS vs. CRISIS  
This table reports the descriptive statistics for the sample of corporate bonds issued in Europe distinguishing on the issue date. Mean and median values are reported for deals 
issued before (pre-crisis) and after (crisis) the 30th June 2007. The statistics for deals underwritten by reputable underwriter are also reported. We consider a deal as reputable 
placed if the underwriter or the syndicate is included in the top 7 of underwriter table leagues provided annually by Dealogic Capital Market according to the market share. We 
have reported variables that refer specifically to the bond, the issuer and the underwriter. We use two tails t-test for difference in means between the two groups of corporate bonds 
(pre-crisis vs. crisis) and Wilcoxon Mann- Whitney test is used for medians (pre-crisis vs. crisis). *, **, *** Different is significant at less than 10%, 5%, 1% level. 
 
CORPORATE BONDS (ALL) Precrisis Crisis 
 
Precrisis Crisis t-test z-test Reputable Underwriter Reputable Underwriter 
Bond Characteristics Mean Median Mean Median t - value z - value Mean Median Mean Median 
Issue Size ($ mill) 444.78 241.38 910.05 630.87 17.48*** 16.91*** 523.69 326.79 910.05 630.87 
Maturity (years) 6.92 5.55 6.09 5.00 -5.28*** -5.62*** 7.45 6.93 6.09 5.00 
Yield (%) 4.70 4.43 4.49 4.07 -2.31** -2.75*** 4.45 4.43 4.49 4.07 
Coupon (%) 4.73 4.38 4.46 4.00 -3.31*** -3.31*** 4.53 4.50 4.46 4.00 
Offer Price (%) 100.08 100.00 99.95 99.89 -2.69*** -5.37*** 100.14 99.94 99.95 99.89 
Effective rating launch 18.75 20.00 17.49 18.00 -10.09*** -12.44*** 18.45 19.00 17.49 18.00 
Gross Fee Spread 0.96 0.76 0.52 0.28 -14.18*** -14.76*** 0.90 0.75 0.52 0.28 
Number of Underwriters 1.84 2.00 2.93 3.00 24.34*** 19.49*** 1.95 2.00 2.93 3.00 
Number of Tranches 1.16 1.00 1.21 1.00 1.43 5.08*** 1.20 1.00 1.21 1.00 
Past Issuer 0.73 1.00 0.54 1.00 -11.99*** -11.30*** 0.77 1.00 0.54 1.00 
First Time Issuer  0.11 0.00 0.14 0.00 2.41** 2.33** 0.11 0.00 0.14 0.00 
Investment Grade 0.93 1.00 0.92 1.00 -1.57 -1.52 0.92 1.00 0.92 1.00 
Callable  0.11 0.00 0.13 0.00 1.40 1.37 0.11 0.00 0.13 0.00 
Collateralized 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 2.59*** 2.22** 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 
Finance Vehicle Issuer  0.21 0.00 0.20 0.00 -0.39 -0.39 0.21 0.00 0.20 0.00 
Private Placement  0.09 0.00 0.07 0.00 -1.39 -1.43 0.04 0.00 0.07 0.00 
Euro Placement 0.70 1.00 0.76 1.00 3.56*** 3.64*** 0.74 1.00 0.76 1.00 
SEC 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.00 3.71*** 3.28*** 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.00 
Rule 144A 0.06 0.00 0.09 0.00 3.38*** 3.15*** 0.07 0.00 0.09 0.00 
Issuer Characteristics Mean Median Mean Median t - value z - value Mean Median Mean Median 
Total Assets ($ bill) 282.79 150.23 510.54 164.96 13.13*** 5.45*** 292.85 120.66 510.54 164.96 
Total Liabilities ($ bill) 267.20 113.11 479.06 115.08 12.58*** 4.81*** 278.93 102.47 479.06 115.08 
Total Equity ($ bill) 15.37 8.17 27.71 11.37 15.06*** 9.67*** 15.08 6.04 27.71 11.37 
Leverage (TL/TA) 0.86 0.95 0.82 0.93 -4.71*** -8.82*** 0.84 0.95 0.82 0.93 
Debt Equity ratio (TL/TE) 373.24 17.94 254.03 13.70 -0.59 -9.59*** 507.02 17.87 254.03 13.70 
Net income ($ bill) 2.25 0.75 2.87 1.25 3.79*** 5.10*** 2.20 0.82 2.87 1.25 
ROA (%) 1.63 0.00 1.84 0.00 1.52 2.78*** 1.70 0.00 1.84 0.00 
ROE (%) 4.39 0.12 5.81 0.12 1.25 0.07 4.25 0.13 5.81 0.12 
Market Capitalization Value ($ bill) 49.37 26.04 37.79 18.28 -3.93*** -3.19*** 42.08 21.79 37.79 18.28 
Issuer Rating 18.83 20.00 17.19 17.67 -12.95*** -16.89*** 18.41 19.67 17.19 17.67 
Issuer Frequency 106.42 22.00 66.46 14.50 -7.35*** -7.08*** 93.11 16.00 66.46 14.50 
Issuer Parent Frequency 131.79 63.00 80.01 29.00 -9.62*** -10.65*** 118.28 63.00 80.01 29.00 
Underwriter Characteristics Mean Median Mean Median t - value z - value Mean Median Mean Median 
Average UW Market Share  5.08 5.09 4.12 4.06 -9.55*** -9.55*** 7.52 7.22 4.12 4.06 
Market Share Worst Reputable UW 3.86 3.23 2.42 1.37 -14.15*** -15.55*** 6.00 5.92 2.42 1.37 





PROBABILITY OF REPUTABLE MATCHING BY ISSUE DATE: PRECRISIS vs. CRISIS (ODDS RATIO) 
This table presents the odds ratio and the z-statistics for the logit regressions for corporate bond issued in Europe 
during 2003 - 2013. The dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the bond is placed by a 
reputable underwriter. Issue size is the natural logarithm of the bond proceeds. The maturity variable is the natural 
logarithm of bond's years to mature. Callability is a dummy for bonds with a call option. The investment grade 
variable is a dummy taking the value 1 for Investment Grade bonds. Number of tranches reflects the tranches forming 
a deal. Total issue is the natural logarithm of the sum of relative issue sizes during the sample period. First issuer is a 
variable taking the value 1 if the bond is the first bond issued by the issuer in the last 15 years. The variable firm size 
is the natural logarithm of the issuer’s total assets. ROA is computed as the return on assets based on the net incomes 
and total assets. Debt equity is a ratio of total liabilities to total equity. Syndicate size reflects the number of deal 
underwriters. Finance vehicle is a variable taking the value 1 if the issuer is a finance vehicle company. The dummy 
variable INDUSTRIAL is a dummy taking the value 1 if the issuer is a non-bank company. Precrisis comprises the 
period of time from 01/01/03 - 30/06/07. Subprime crisis starts 01/07/07 until 30/09/08. The banking crisis window 
comprises 01/10/08 - 30/06/10. Since 01/07/10 we consider the period as the European sovereign debt crisis. *, **, 
*** Coefficients are statistically significant different than zero at least at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
VARIABLES Precrisis Subprime Crisis Banking Crisis Sovereign Debt 
Crisis 
     
Issue Size 1.490*** 1.795* 1.632*** 1.676*** 
 (0.124) (0.537) (0.149) (0.197) 
Maturity 1.444** 1.068 2.689*** 1.981*** 
 (0.213) (0.299) (0.758) (0.331) 
Callability 0.847 3.079 1.148 1.401 
 (0.232) (2.357) (0.464) (0.302) 
Investment Grade  0.749 0.400 0.608 0.866 
 (0.287) (0.984) (0.282) (0.260) 
Nº Tranches 0.894 0.728 0.839 1.037 
 (0.0929) (0.264) (0.168) (0.105) 
Total Issue 0.950 1.134 0.477*** 0.855 
 (0.0827) (0.294) (0.0977) (0.0964) 
First Issuer 0.684 0.628 0.786 0.478** 
 (0.192) (0.471) (0.284) (0.162) 
Firm Size 0.994 1.052 1.939*** 1.051 
 (0.104) (0.282) (0.394) (0.127) 
ROA 0.993 0.892 0.919** 1.007 
 (0.0271) (0.0699) (0.0375) (0.0230) 
Debt to Equity 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000 1.000 
 (4.39e-06) (1.64e-05) (3.29e-05) (1.41e-05) 
Syndicate Size 0.896 0.846 0.660*** 0.654*** 
 (0.119) (0.214) (0.0684) (0.0521) 
Finance Vehicle 0.542* 0.532 1.003 0.819 
 (0.201) (0.367) (0.420) (0.198) 
INDUSTRIAL 1.388 5.020* 10.92*** 0.683 
 (0.527) (4.956) (5.425) (0.259) 
Constant 0.111** 0.00719* 0.00102*** 0.0250*** 
 (0.0991) (0.0186) (0.00127) (0.0296) 
     
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Countries Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard Errors Cluster Issuer Cluster Issuer Cluster Issuer Cluster Issuer 
Pseudo R2 0.0867 0.2094 0.3272 0.1648 
Log-Likelihood -701.6138 -136.4062 -342.8101 -644.0233 
p-value (chi2)) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 





PROBABILITY OF REPUTABLE MATCHING FOR NON-FINANCIAL AND BANKING 
CORPORATE BONDS (LOGIT COEFFICIENTS) 
This table presents the logit coefficients and the z-statistics (in parenthesis) for the logit regressions for non-
financial and banking corporate bonds issued in Europe during 2003-2013. The dependent variable is a binary 
variable that takes the value 1 if the bond is placed by a reputable underwriter. Issue size is the natural logarithm 
of the bond proceeds. The maturity variable is the natural logarithm of bond's years to mature. Callability is a 
dummy for bonds with a call option. The investment grade variable is a dummy taking the value 1 for Investment 
Grade bonds. Number of tranches reflects the tranches forming a deal. Total issue is the natural logarithm of the 
sum of relative issue sizes during the sample period. First issuer is a variable taking the value 1 if the bond is the 
first bond issued by the issuer in the last 15 years. The variable firm size is the natural logarithm of issuer’s total 
assets. ROA is computed as the return on assets based on the net incomes and total assets. Debt equity is a ratio 
of total liabilities to total equity. Industries dummies are based on SIC classification. Syndicate size reflects the 
number of deal underwriters. Finance vehicle is a variable taking the value 1 if the issuer is a finance vehicle 
company. Z-statistics are based on issuer clustered standard errors. A constant term (not reported) is included in 
all regressions. *, **, *** Coefficients are statistically significant different than zero at least at 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels. 
 Non-Financial Corporate Bonds Banking corporate bond 
VARIABLES I II III IV I II 
       
Issue Size 0.721*** 0.645*** 0.716*** 0.652*** 0.434*** 0.407*** 
 (0.117) (0.105) (0.108) (0.106) (0.0769) (0.0694) 
Maturity 0.426** 0.494** 0.410** 0.450*** 0.626*** 0.551*** 
 (0.209) (0.215) (0.169) (0.174) (0.135) (0.125) 
Callability 0.367* 0.382* 0.248 0.268 -0.573* -0.590** 
 (0.203) (0.214) (0.200) (0.209) (0.297) (0.284) 
Investment Grade 0.257 0.111 0.0861 -0.0409 -1.345** -0.990* 
 (0.261) (0.278) (0.261) (0.254) (0.551) (0.528) 
Nº Tranches 0.103 0.0912 0.0416 0.0364 -0.249* -0.307** 
 (0.105) (0.0976) (0.101) (0.0999) (0.148) (0.152) 
Total Issue -0.185 -0.236* -0.337** -0.336** -0.197*** -0.125 
 (0.147) (0.138) (0.137) (0.136) (0.0751) (0.0846) 
First Issuer -0.728*** -0.634*** -0.693*** -0.564*** -0.311 -0.233 
 (0.220) (0.209) (0.223) (0.215) (0.276) (0.270) 
Firm Size -0.0101 0.219 0.115 0.284** 0.416*** 0.242** 
 (0.141) (0.134) (0.128) (0.129) (0.126) (0.119) 
ROA -0.0114 -0.00616 -0.0250 -0.0219 22.09 25.51 
 (0.0171) (0.0164) (0.0169) (0.0162) (21.39) (24.64) 
Debt to Equity -0.00371*** -0.00431*** -0.00344*** -0.00366*** 8.49e-06 6.80e-06 
 (0.00115) (0.00122) (0.00111) (0.00112) (8.30e-06) (7.74e-06) 
Syndicate Size -0.293*** -0.314*** -0.284*** -0.314*** -0.512*** -0.433*** 
 (0.0588) (0.0557) (0.0610) (0.0580) (0.133) (0.124) 
Finance Vehicle -0.412** -0.303* -0.587*** -0.400** 1.163 1.170* 
 (0.199) (0.191) (0.215) (0.203) (0.712) (0.614) 
       
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industries No Yes No Yes - - 
Countries No No Yes Yes No Yes 












Pseudo R2 0.1951 0.2206 0.2282 0.2469 0.2092 0.2220 
Log-Likelihood -776.71 -752.16 -744.75 -726.74 -1092.06 -1074.35 
p-value (chi2)) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Predicted Prob. 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.32 0.32 




MARGINAL EFFECTS ON THE PROBABILITY OF REPUTABLE MATCHING FOR NON-FINANCIAL AND 
BANKS CORPORATE BONDS 
This table presents the marginal effects for the logit regressions for non-financial and banks corporate bonds issued in Europe 
during 2003- 2013. The dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the bond is underwritten by a reputable 
underwriter. Issue size is the natural logarithm of the bond proceeds. The maturity variable is the natural logarithm of bond's 
years to mature. Callability is a dummy for bonds with a call option. The investment grade variable is a dummy taking the value 1 
for Investment Grade bonds. Number of tranches reflects the tranches forming a deal. Total issue is the natural logarithm of the 
sum of relative issue sizes during the sample period. First issuer is a variable taking the value 1 if the bond is the first bond issued 
by the issuer in the last 15 years. The variable firm size is the natural logarithm of the issuer's total assets. ROA is computed as 
the return on assets based on the net incomes and total assets. Debt equity is a ratio of total liabilities to total equity. Syndicate 
size reflects the number of deal underwriters. Finance vehicle is a variable taking the value 1 if the issuer is a finance vehicle 
company. Industries dummies are based on SIC classification. A constant term (not reported) is included in all regressions. MEM 
presents the Marginal Effects at Means. AME presents the Average Marginal Effects. *, **, *** Coefficients are statistically 
significant different than zero at least at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
 
NON-FINANCIAL BANKS 
MEM: Marginal Effects 
at Means 
AME: Average Marginal 
Effects 
 Non-financial – Banks Non-financial – Banks 
VARIABLES 







           
Issue Size 0.136*** 0.104*** 0.0800*** 0.0653*** 0.056 5.60 1.70 0.0387 3.87 1.59 
 (0.0222) (0.0165) (0.0145) (0.0102)       
Maturity 0.0942*** 0.0722*** 0.108*** 0.0885*** -0.0138 -1.38 0.87 -0.0163 -1.63 0.82 
 (0.0371) (0.0282) (0.0249) (0.0203)       
Callability 0.0561 0.0430 -0.116** -0.0948** 0.1721 17.21 -0.48 0.1378 13.78 -0.45 
 (0.0438) (0.0333) (0.0560) (0.0455)       
Investment Grade -0.00857 -0.00656 -0.195* -0.159* 0.18643 18.64 0.04 0.15244 15.24 0.04 
 (0.0532) (0.0408) (0.103) (0.0834)       
Nº Tranches 0.00761 0.00583 -0.0604** -0.0493** 0.06801 6.80 -0.13 0.05513 5.51 -0.12 
 (0.0209) (0.0160) (0.0300) (0.0238)       
Total Issue -0.0703** -0.0539** -0.0247 -0.0202 -0.0456 -4.56 2.85 -0.0337 -3.37 2.67 
 (0.0282) (0.0215) (0.0166) (0.0135)       
First Issuer -0.118*** -0.0905*** -0.0459 -0.0375 -0.0721 -7.21 2.57 -0.053 -5.30 2.41 
 (0.0451) (0.0342) (0.0534) (0.0434)       
Firm Size 0.0595** 0.0456** 0.0475** 0.0388** 0.012 1.20 1.25 0.0068 0.68 1.18 
 (0.0268) (0.0205) (0.0235) (0.0186)       
ROA -0.00458 -0.00351 5.017 4.098 -5.02158 -502.16 0.00 -4.10151 -410.15 0.00 
 (0.00336) (0.00257) (4.828) (3.980)       
Debt to Equity -0.00076*** -0.00058*** 1.34e-06 1.09e-06 -0.00076 -0.08 -570.90 -0.00058 -0.06 -537.61 
 (0.000234) (0.000179) (1.51e-06) (1.24e-06)       
Syndicate Size -0.0658*** -0.0504*** -0.0852*** -0.0696*** 0.0194 1.51 0.77 0.0192 1.92 0.72 
 (0.0125) (0.00941) (0.0262) (0.0204)       
Finance Vehicle -0.0837** -0.0641** 0.230* 0.188* -0.3137 -30.52 -0.36 -0.2521 -25.21 -0.34 
 (0.0419) (0.0323) (0.122) (0.0978)       
           
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes       
Industries Yes Yes - -       
Countries Yes Yes Yes Yes       




      
Pseudo R2 0.2469 0.2220       
Log-Likelihood -726.74 -1074.35       
p-value (chi2)) 0.00 0.00       
Observations 1,490 2,197       
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ROBUSTNESS ON THE PROBABILITY OF REPUTABLE MATCHING: SUB-SAMPLE OF BONDS OF INDUSTRIAL FIRMS AND BANKS THAT ISSUED AT LEAST ONCE 
IN THE PRECRISIS AND CRISIS PERIODS (ODDS RATIO) 
This table presents the odds ratio and the z-statistics for the logit regressions for corporate bond issued in Europe during 2003 – 2013 for the sub-sample of bonds of industrial firms and banks 
that issued at least once in both periods: precrisis and the crisis. The dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the bond is placed by a reputable underwriter. Issue size is the 
natural logarithm of the bond proceeds. The maturity variable is the natural logarithm of bond's years to mature. Callability is a dummy for bonds with a call option. The investment grade 
variable is a dummy taking the value 1 for Investment Grade bonds. Number of tranches reflects the tranches forming a deal. Total issue is the natural logarithm of the sum of relative issue sizes 
during the sample period. First issuer is a variable taking the value 1 if the bond is the first bond issued by the issuer in the last 15 years. The variable firm size is the natural logarithm of the 
issuer’s total assets. ROA is computed as the return on assets based on the net incomes and total assets. Debt equity is a ratio of total liabilities to total equity. Syndicate size reflects the number 
of deal underwriters. Finance vehicle is a variable taking the value 1 if the issuer is a finance vehicle company. The dummy variable INDUSTRIAL is a dummy taking the value 1 if the issuer is 
a non-bank company. Precrisis comprises the period of time from 01/01/03 - 30/06/07. Subprime crisis starts 01/07/07 until 30/09/08. The banking crisis window comprises 01/10/08 - 30/06/10. 
Since 01/07/10 we consider the period as the European sovereign debt crisis. A constant term (not reported) is included in all regressions. Z-statistics are based on robust standard errors. *, **, 
*** Coefficients are statistically significant different than zero at least at 10%, 5% and 1% levels.  
VARIABLES 2003 - 2013 Precrisis Subprime crisis Banking crisis Sovereign Debt crisis 
      
Issue Size 1.630*** 1.526*** 1.919*** 1.693*** 1.731*** 
 (0.0711) (0.106) (0.407) (0.193) (0.161) 
Maturity 1.653*** 1.369** 0.828 2.635*** 1.978*** 
 (0.149) (0.192) (0.219) (0.641) (0.348) 
Callability 0.930 0.883 2.165 1.247 1.072 
 (0.151) (0.234) (1.738) (0.617) (0.278) 
Investment Grade 0.791 0.367** 0.862 1.031 1.309 
 (0.187) (0.172) (1.593) (0.626) (0.552) 
Nº Tranches 0.892 0.911 0.803 0.714 0.957 
 (0.0652) (0.0701) (0.292) (0.149) (0.104) 
Total Issue 0.795*** 0.999 0.984 0.390*** 0.796** 
 (0.0490) (0.0974) (0.294) (0.0693) (0.0881) 
First Issuer 0.759 0.684 0.343 1.357 0.390 
 (0.194) (0.220) (0.411) (0.911) (0.354) 
Firm Size 1.084 0.955 0.995 2.002*** 0.984 
 (0.0624) (0.0832) (0.243) (0.376) (0.110) 
ROA 0.965** 0.987 0.892** 0.940 0.985 
 (0.0157) (0.0270) (0.0498) (0.0425) (0.0316) 
Debt to Equity 1.000** 1.000 1.000*** 1.000 1.000 
 (8.01e-06) (9.71e-06) (2.15e-05) (3.19e-05) (3.04e-05) 
Syndicate Size 0.682*** 0.915 0.773 0.600*** 0.603*** 
 (0.0275) (0.0785) (0.141) (0.0606) (0.0437) 
Finance Vehicle 0.717** 0.556** 0.637 0.849 0.677 
 (0.0952) (0.138) (0.315) (0.258) (0.178) 
INDUSTRIAL 1.531** 1.333 3.406* 10.89*** 0.698 
 (0.280) (0.390) (2.916) (5.988) (0.248) 
      
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Countries Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.1681 0.0922 0.1692 0.3306 0.1816 
Log-Likelihood -1560.0434 -628.7560 -123.9553 -259.0286 -462.5543 
p-value (chi2)) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 






ROBUSTNESS ON THE PROBABILITY OF REPUTABLE MATCHING: SUBSAMPLES OF BANKS (ODDS RATIO) 
This table presents the odds ratio and the z-statistics for the logit regressions for non-financial and banking corporate bonds issued in Europe during 2003 - 2013. Columns I to III consider a 
subsample of banks hat annually issued corporate bonds but did not act as underwriter. Columns IV to VI consider a subsample of banks that annually issued corporate bonds and acted as 
underwriters for other issuers. Columns VII to IX consider a subsample of banks that issued corporate bonds and acted as underwriters for other issuers with an underwriter market share larger 
than 0.5%. The dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the bond is placed by a reputable underwriter. Issue size is the natural logarithm of the bond proceeds. The maturity 
variable is the natural logarithm of bond's years to mature. Callability is a dummy for bonds with a call option. The investment grade variable is a dummy taking the value 1 for Investment Grade 
bonds. Number of tranches reflects the tranches forming a deal. Total issue is the natural logarithm of the sum of relative issue sizes during the sample period. First issuer is a variable taking the 
value 1 if the bond is the first bond issued by the issuer in the last 15 years. The variable firm size is the natural logarithm of the issuer’s total assets. ROA is computed as the return on assets based 
on the net incomes and total assets. Debt equity is a ratio of total liabilities to total equity. Syndicate size reflects the number of deal underwriters. Finance vehicle is a variable taking the value 1 if 
the issuer is a finance vehicle company. The dummy variable INDUSTRIAL is a dummy taking the value 1 if the issuer is a non-bank company. *, **, *** Coefficients are statistically significant 
different than zero at least at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
 Subsample: Pure Bank Issuers Subsample: Bank Issuers & Underwriters Subsample: Bank Issuers & Underwriters with market share >0.5 
VARIABLES 2003-2013 Precrisis Crisis 2003-2013 Precrisis Crisis 2003-2013 Precrisis Crisis 
          
Issue Size 1.681*** 1.689*** 1.681*** 1.581*** 1.603*** 1.754*** 1.562*** 1.579*** 1.750*** 
 (0.149) (0.202) (0.216) (0.0943) (0.123) (0.133) (0.101) (0.136) (0.145) 
Maturity 2.051*** 1.476 2.392*** 1.735*** 1.495*** 1.965*** 1.745*** 1.523*** 1.926*** 
 (0.313) (0.364) (0.493) (0.208) (0.187) (0.284) (0.200) (0.211) (0.275) 
Callability 1.065 0.973 1.194 1.159 1.201 1.304 1.285 1.275 1.372* 
 (0.188) (0.315) (0.240) (0.189) (0.215) (0.224) (0.220) (0.241) (0.242) 
Investment Grade 0.757 0.743 0.786 0.961 1.064 0.967 1.111 1.089 1.055 
 (0.183) (0.307) (0.211) (0.226) (0.258) (0.228) (0.270) (0.271) (0.255) 
Nº Tranches 1.040 0.846 1.047 0.966 1.033 0.943 0.964 1.117 0.923 
 (0.102) (0.186) (0.114) (0.0596) (0.0670) (0.0739) (0.0754) (0.107) (0.0740) 
Total Issue 0.936 1.050 0.832 0.760*** 0.784*** 0.734*** 0.687*** 0.702*** 0.703*** 
 (0.0888) (0.127) (0.119) (0.0683) (0.0739) (0.0779) (0.0683) (0.0736) (0.0782) 
First Issuer 0.712* 0.751 0.638* 0.567*** 0.510*** 0.622** 0.547*** 0.495*** 0.603** 
 (0.129) (0.219) (0.162) (0.117) (0.108) (0.132) (0.119) (0.104) (0.130) 
Firm Size 1.042 0.905 1.192 1.295** 1.111 1.377*** 1.328** 1.208* 1.359** 
 (0.0961) (0.103) (0.161) (0.139) (0.115) (0.164) (0.155) (0.131) (0.163) 
ROA 0.985 1.003 0.974 0.972 0.981 0.969 0.973 0.981 0.972 
 (0.0162) (0.0226) (0.0189) (0.0206) (0.0166) (0.0194) (0.0199) (0.0166) (0.0189) 
Debt to Equity 1.000* 1.000 1.000* 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (1.18e-05) (0.00137) (1.22e-05) (4.37e-06) (4.41e-06) (1.02e-05) (1.35e-05) (0.00225) (1.17e-05) 
Syndicate Size 0.751*** 0.890 0.725*** 0.712*** 0.821*** 0.675*** 0.716*** 0.809*** 0.688*** 
 (0.0375) (0.111) (0.0394) (0.0608) (0.0510) (0.0534) (0.0585) (0.0477) (0.0540) 
Finance Vehicle 0.505*** 0.412*** 0.538** 0.659 0.576** 0.623* 0.709 0.603** 0.634* 
 (0.100) (0.115) (0.130) (0.168) (0.132) (0.157) (0.177) (0.130) (0.154) 
INDUSTRIAL 1.642** 1.380 2.124** 2.360*** 1.292 3.332*** 1.989* 1.361 2.722*** 
 (0.387) (0.458) (0.752) (0.700) (0.480) (1.075) (0.725) (0.532) (1.016) 
Constant 0.00655*** 0.0546*** 0.00310*** 0.00782*** 0.0231*** 0.00225*** 0.0131*** 0.0226*** 0.00347*** 
 (0.00522) (0.0565) (0.00341) (0.00684) (0.0205) (0.00221) (0.0133) (0.0204) (0.00355) 
          
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Countries Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard Errors Cluster Issuer Cluster Issuer Cluster Issuer Cluster Issuer Cluster Issuer Cluster Issuer Cluster Issuer Cluster Issuer Cluster Issuer 
Pseudo R2 0.1713 0.1302 0.1655 0.1959 0.1749 0.2309 0.2004 0.1797 0.2321 
Log-Likelihood -1102.7375 -389.27226 -699.21456 -1594.1836 -1066.2555 -1267.561 -1422.6021 -999.81438 -1169.8465 
p-value (chi2)) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 




ROBUSTNESS ON THE PROBABILITY OF REPUTABLE MATCHING FOR BANKING CORPORATE BONDS CONTROLLING FOR BANKS’ REPUTATION (ODDS RATIO) 
This table presents the odds ratio and the z-statistics (in parenthesis) for the logit regressions for banking corporate bonds issued in Europe during 2003- 2013. The dependent variable is a binary variable 
that takes the value 1 if the bond is underwritten by a reputable underwriter. Issue size is the natural logarithm of the bond proceeds. The maturity variable is the natural logarithm of bond's years to 
mature. Callability is a dummy for bonds with a call option. The investment grade variable is a dummy taking the value 1 for Investment Grade bonds. Number of tranches reflects the tranches forming a 
deal. Total issue is the natural logarithm of the sum of relative issue sizes during the sample period. First issuer is a variable taking the value 1 if the bond is the first bond issued by the issuer in the last 15 
years. The variable firm size is the natural logarithm of the issuer’s total assets. ROA is computed as the return on assets based on the net incomes and total assets. Debt equity is a ratio of total liabilities 
to total equity. Syndicate size reflects the number of deal underwriters. Finance vehicle is a variable taking the value 1 if the issuer is a finance vehicle company. In columns I to VI BANK 
REPUTATION is banks’ market share as underwriters. In Columns VII to XII BANK REPUTATION is a dummy taking the value 1 if the issuer bank is a Top 7 underwriter. Z-statistics are based on 
issuer clustered standard errors. A constant term (not reported) is included in all regressions. *, **, *** Coefficients are statistically significant different than zero at least at 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
 BANK REPUTATION = Bank’s Underwriter Market Share BANK REPUTATION = Bank Top 7 Underwriter 
VARIABLES 














             
Issue Size 1.451*** 1.430*** 1.499*** 0.905 1.775*** 1.731*** 1.434*** 1.422*** 1.494*** 0.989 1.727*** 1.769*** 
 (0.101) (0.131) (0.149) (0.348) (0.263) (0.223) (0.0999) (0.132) (0.142) (0.346) (0.250) (0.209) 
Maturity 1.743*** 1.488** 1.931*** 0.809 1.165 2.498*** 1.878*** 1.527*** 2.246*** 0.760 1.245 3.032*** 
 (0.219) (0.231) (0.335) (0.391) (0.455) (0.531) (0.240) (0.234) (0.379) (0.425) (0.564) (0.673) 
Callability 0.517** 0.463** 0.699 9.191 2.842 0.365** 0.430*** 0.400** 0.575 5.766 2.410 0.314** 
 (0.141) (0.164) (0.296) (13.55) (3.412) (0.168) (0.120) (0.147) (0.259) (8.676) (3.155) (0.170) 
Investment Grade 0.517 0.675 0.701 0.341 1.439 0.657 0.485 0.596 0.699 0.366 1.375 0.715 
 (0.279) (0.478) (0.561) (0.654) (1.301) (0.563) (0.263) (0.422) (0.556) (0.679) (1.178) (0.586) 
Nº Tranches 0.688** 0.460 0.720** 0.429 0.448*** 0.786 0.662*** 0.612 0.702** 0.512 0.390*** 0.791 
 (0.102) (0.280) (0.107) (0.232) (0.137) (0.133) (0.101) (0.363) (0.108) (0.245) (0.131) (0.140) 
Total Issue 0.855* 0.899 0.818* 0.856 0.707 0.876 0.877 0.944 0.826 0.862 0.739 0.900 
 (0.0732) (0.0912) (0.0987) (0.301) (0.196) (0.121) (0.0764) (0.0891) (0.0989) (0.329) (0.200) (0.115) 
First Issuer 0.730 0.755 0.621 0.297 1.543 0.256** 0.746 0.809 0.654 0.266 1.572 0.278** 
 (0.195) (0.313) (0.243) (0.336) (1.025) (0.163) (0.202) (0.332) (0.250) (0.296) (0.935) (0.176) 
Firm Size 1.060 1.036 1.048 1.068 1.422 0.835 1.082 0.998 1.068 1.190 1.386 0.817 
 (0.120) (0.127) (0.165) (0.383) (0.467) (0.152) (0.122) (0.116) (0.162) (0.452) (0.445) (0.142) 
ROA 1.235e+07 5.889e+13 3,750 1.154e+29 0.00606 4.917e+07 423,307 6.697e+07 1,084 5.266e+25 0.0989 2,872 
 (2.414e+08) (2.134e+15) (72,953) (7.649e+30) (0.0597) (1.315e+09) (7.384e+06) (2.153e+09) (18,147) (3.502e+27) (1.050) (70,600) 
Debt to Equity 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000** 0.998 1.000* 1.000 1.000* 1.000 1.000* 0.998 1.000* 
 (8.32e-06) (8.43e-06) (2.11e-05) (2.19e-05) (0.00144) (2.23e-05) (8.94e-06) (7.76e-06) (2.03e-05) (2.34e-05) (0.00166) (2.44e-05) 
Syndicate Size 0.742*** 0.772 0.721*** 0.797 0.573*** 0.789** 0.783** 0.775 0.754*** 0.844 0.621*** 0.821* 
 (0.0780) (0.156) (0.0724) (0.297) (0.101) (0.0878) (0.0916) (0.162) (0.0808) (0.302) (0.101) (0.0975) 
Finance Vehicle 2.819* 1.280 3.762** 21.36** 102.9*** 0.197** 3.771** 0.806 5.116*** 23.68** 236.7*** 0.219* 
 (1.721) (1.317) (2.291) (30.98) (177.3) (0.135) (2.533) (0.761) (3.199) (32.60) (480.6) (0.176) 
BANK REPUTATION 1.296*** 1.177** 1.343*** 1.567*** 1.493*** 1.390*** 16.80*** 16.50*** 17.08*** 80.63*** 42.84*** 23.90*** 
 (0.0553) (0.0793) (0.0907) (0.187) (0.196) (0.132) (5.572) (7.563) (6.873) (76.91) (32.36) (10.27) 
             
Constant 0.101** 0.212 0.0899 5.377 0.00417** 0.216 0.0548*** 0.185 0.0506* 0.801 0.00457** 0.128 
 (0.106) (0.274) (0.143) (20.68) (0.00972) (0.397) (0.0574) (0.221) (0.0774) (2.668) (0.0107) (0.229) 
             
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Countries Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
























Pseudo R2 -1032.5641 -458.3386 -558.3643 -59.126437 -127.80534 -312.23006 -985.41718 -439.2027 -529.10941 -55.410239 -118.41241 -292.26709 
Log-Likelihood 0.2523 0.1052 0.3305 0.4195 0.5452 0.2703 0.2864 0.1426 0.3656 0.4560 0.5786 0.3170 
p-value (chi2)) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 





ROBUSTNESS ON THE PROBABILITY OF REPUTABLE MATCHING FOR BANKING CORPORATE 
BONDS CONTROLLING FOR BANKS’ REPUTATION AND SELF-UNDERWRITING (ODDS RATIO) 
This table presents the odds ratio and the z-statistics (in parenthesis) for the logit regressions for banking corporate 
bonds issued in Europe during 2003- 2013. The dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the 
bond is underwritten by a reputable underwriter. Issue size is the natural logarithm of the bond proceeds. The 
maturity variable is the natural logarithm of bond's years to mature. Callability is a dummy for bonds with a call 
option. The investment grade variable is a dummy taking the value 1 for Investment Grade bonds. Number of 
tranches reflects the tranches forming a deal. Total issue is the natural logarithm of the sum of relative issue sizes 
during the sample period. First issuer is a variable taking the value 1 if the bond is the first bond issued by the 
issuer in the last 15 years. The variable firm size is the natural logarithm of the issuer’s total assets. ROA is 
computed as the return on assets based on the net incomes and total assets. Debt equity is a ratio of total liabilities 
to total equity. Syndicate size reflects the number of deal underwriters. Finance vehicle is a variable taking the 
value 1 if the issuer is a finance vehicle company. In column I to VI Bank reputation is banks’ market share as 
underwriters. In Columns VII to XII Bank Reputation is a dummy taking the value 1 if the issuer bank is a Top 7 
underwriter. Self-Underwriter is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the bank has in the same year issued bonds that it 
has placed by itself and other bonds that have been placed by third parties. Z-statistics are based on issuer clustered 
standard errors. A constant term (not reported) is included in all regressions. *, **, *** Coefficients are statistically 
significant different than zero at least at 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
 BANK REPUTATION = Bank’s 
Underwriter Market Share 
BANK REPUTATION = Bank Top 7 
Underwriter 
VARIABLES 2003-2013 Precrisis Crisis 2003-2013 Precrisis Crisis 
       
Issue Size 1.449*** 1.438*** 1.518*** 1.432*** 1.427*** 1.509*** 
 (0.101) (0.139) (0.153) (0.0991) (0.136) (0.145) 
Maturity 1.743*** 1.499*** 1.892*** 1.874*** 1.531*** 2.193*** 
 (0.222) (0.229) (0.321) (0.241) (0.233) (0.362) 
Callability 0.524** 0.429** 0.717 0.441*** 0.382** 0.585 
 (0.144) (0.159) (0.300) (0.123) (0.145) (0.257) 
Investment Grade 0.548 0.639 0.686 0.504 0.555 0.678 
 (0.296) (0.469) (0.539) (0.272) (0.405) (0.528) 
Nº Tranches 0.692** 0.469 0.725** 0.668*** 0.618 0.706** 
 (0.101) (0.295) (0.103) (0.0988) (0.367) (0.103) 
Total Issue 0.863* 0.895 0.819* 0.882 0.937 0.823 
 (0.0743) (0.0899) (0.0977) (0.0773) (0.0885) (0.0976) 
First Issuer 0.710 0.785 0.593 0.720 0.843 0.621 
 (0.190) (0.329) (0.232) (0.196) (0.352) (0.240) 
Firm Size 1.045 1.041 1.054 1.075 1.014 1.084 
 (0.119) (0.129) (0.165) (0.122) (0.119) (0.166) 
ROA 7.931e+06 2.422e+13 7,176 581,399 2.210e+08 3,198 
 (1.518e+08) (8.669e+14) (138,516) (1.009e+07) (7.179e+09) (54,077) 
Debt to Equity 1.000 1.000* 1.000 1.000 1.000** 1.000 
 (8.41e-06) (8.03e-06) (1.93e-05) (8.97e-06) (7.98e-06) (1.88e-05) 
Syndicate Size 0.745*** 0.776 0.719*** 0.784** 0.779 0.752*** 
 (0.0790) (0.160) (0.0720) (0.0916) (0.161) (0.0807) 
Finance Vehicle 2.844* 1.100 3.907** 3.725* 0.753 5.143*** 
 (1.761) (1.056) (2.432) (2.519) (0.727) (3.260) 
Self Underwriter 0.720 1.119 0.470 0.759 1.197 0.589 
 (0.264) (0.582) (0.250) (0.220) (0.533) (0.222) 
Bank Reputation 1.268*** 1.155** 1.301*** 14.35*** 12.69*** 14.05*** 
 (0.0521) (0.0832) (0.0854) (4.493) (6.413) (5.103) 
Self-Underwriter*Bank Reputation 1.122 1.174 1.187 1.904 2.670 2.388 
 (0.0992) (0.173) (0.133) (1.287) (3.555) (1.436) 
Constant 0.109** 0.204 0.0875 0.0565*** 0.163 0.0459** 
 (0.114) (0.264) (0.138) (0.0587) (0.199) (0.0699) 
       
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Countries Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 












Pseudo R2 -1030.6916 -456.72589 -555.42851 -984.06654 -438.47717 -527.01242 
Log-Likelihood 0.2536 0.1083 0.3341 0.2874 0.1440 0.3681 
p-value (chi2)) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 




ROBUSTNESS ON THE PROBABILITY OF REPUTABLE MATCHING (PRECRISIS vs. CRISIS): EXTRA 
CONTROLS (ODDS RATIO) 
This table presents the odds ratio and the z-statistics for the logit regressions for corporate bond issued in Europe 
during 2003 – 2013 including extra control variables. The dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the value 1 
if the bond is placed by a reputable underwriter. 
Robustness variables: Floated coupon is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the bond presents a floated coupon based on 
an index (e.g. Libor or Euribor). Currencies are dummies taking the value 1 if the whole deal has been issued in euros 
(€), pounds (£), American dollars ($) or in other currencies according to the specific currency-dummy. SEC is a 
dummy that takes the value 1 if the bond is totally sold in the USA under SEC Rule. Rule 144A is a dummy that takes 
the value 1 if the bond is totally US marketed via 144A. Simultaneity is a continuous variable built adding all proceeds 
issued in a time-window of 30 days considering the central point the issue date. A constant term (not reported) is 
included in all regressions. Z-statistics are based on clustered issuer standard errors. *, **, *** Coefficients are 
statistically significant different than zero at least at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 






       
Issue Size 1.537*** 1.551*** 1.541*** 1.546 1.550*** 1.444*** 
 (0.0894) (0.158) (0.121) (0.473) (0.155) (0.173) 
Maturity 1.645*** 1.379** 1.718*** 0.726 2.238*** 1.846*** 
 (0.186) (0.221) (0.238) (0.241) (0.628) (0.306) 
Callability 0.830 0.855 0.934 3.041 0.778 0.928 
 (0.148) (0.260) (0.192) (3.286) (0.351) (0.232) 
Investment Grade  0.950 0.787 0.984 0.115 0.786 1.047 
 (0.216) (0.328) (0.251) (0.364) (0.366) (0.348) 
Nº Tranches 1.079 0.981 1.160 5.572** 1.056 1.179 
 (0.0820) (0.0720) (0.133) (4.523) (0.265) (0.177) 
Total Issue 0.841** 0.931 0.770** 1.096 0.473*** 0.876 
 (0.0597) (0.0819) (0.0782) (0.311) (0.103) (0.0982) 
First Issuer 0.664** 0.658 0.605** 0.640 0.793 0.448** 
 (0.115) (0.194) (0.137) (0.479) (0.289) (0.153) 
Firm Size 1.132 0.996 1.284** 1.224 2.017*** 1.063 
 (0.0959) (0.104) (0.134) (0.403) (0.419) (0.140) 
ROA 0.980 1.003 0.979 0.872 0.931* 1.011 
 (0.0226) (0.0323) (0.0233) (0.0859) (0.0368) (0.0247) 
Debt to Equity 1.000*** 1.000** 1.000** 1.002 1.000 1.000 
 (4.68e-06) (4.91e-06) (1.01e-05) (0.00130) (3.22e-05) (1.42e-05) 
Syndicate Size 0.712*** 0.920 0.662*** 0.718 0.645*** 0.644*** 
 (0.0499) (0.125) (0.0463) (0.193) (0.0710) (0.0534) 
Finance Vehicle 0.690 0.525 0.806 0.563 0.931 0.750 
 (0.183) (0.213) (0.234) (0.421) (0.399) (0.187) 
Floated Coupon 0.528*** 0.483* 0.542** 0.0109** 0.658 0.578 
 (0.119) (0.199) (0.163) (0.0196) (0.309) (0.216) 
Curr: EUR 0.990 1.439 0.800 4.957* 3.343** 0.417** 
 (0.236) (0.503) (0.263) (4.655) (1.817) (0.171) 
Curr: GBP 2.423*** 7.595*** 1.377 10.91* 4.736** 0.648 
 (0.766) (3.968) (0.489) (15.02) (2.960) (0.313) 
Curr: Other Curr. 0.859 1.703* 0.492** 1.912 2.487* 0.275*** 
 (0.205) (0.505) (0.157) (1.963) (1.304) (0.114) 
SEC 1.645 1.998 1.048 0.936 4.954* 0.862 
 (0.728) (0.973) (0.560) (0.989) (4.691) (0.461) 
Rule144A 1.983** 1.500 2.025* 2.168 4.868** 1.940 
 (0.553) (0.556) (0.768) (2.757) (3.241) (0.924) 
Simult. 30days 1.000 1.000** 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (2.66e-06) (3.01e-06) (3.85e-06) (1.74e-05) (5.63e-06) (5.81e-06) 
INDUSTRIAL 1.497* 1.331 1.953** 9.620* 11.66*** 0.825 
 (0.370) (0.550) (0.649) (11.99) (6.319) (0.327) 
       
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Countries Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard Errors Cluster Issuer Cluster Issuer Cluster Issuer Cluster Issuer Cluster Issuer Cluster Issuer 
Pseudo R2 0.1945 0.1160 0.2336 0.2575 0.3373 0.1975 
Log-Likelihood -1891.0164 -679.06974 -1160.1305 -128.09313 -337.67829 -618.82035 
p-value (chi2)) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 




ROBUSTNESS ON THE PROBABILITY OF REPUTABLE MATCHING: NON-FINANCIAL AND 
BANKING CORPORATE BONDS  
This table presents the logit coefficients and the z-statistics (in parenthesis) for the logit regressions for non-
financial and banking corporate bonds issued in Europe during 2003 - 2013. The dependent variable is a binary 
variable that takes the value 1 if the bond is placed by a reputable underwriter. 
Robustness variables: Past issuer is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the issuer has issued corporate bonds at least 
once 15 years prior to the start of the sample period (from 1988 to 2003). Floated coupon is a dummy that takes the 
value 1 if the bond presents a floated coupon based on an index (e.g. Libor or Euribor). Currencies are dummies 
taking the value 1 if the whole deal has been issued in euros (€), pounds (£), American dollars ($) or in other 
currencies according to the specific currency-dummy. SEC is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the bond is totally 
sold in the USA under SEC Rule. Rule 144A is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the bond is totally US marketed 
via 144A. Public Bank issuer is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the issuer is not a sector private bank. 
Self&NotSelf is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the bank has in the same year issued bonds that it has placed by 
itself and other bonds that have been placed by third parties Simultaneity variables are continuous variables built 
adding all proceeds issued in a time-window considering the central point the issue date. The time-window 
comprises days before and after the issue date; a 90 days-window covers all proceeds issued 45 days before and 45 
days after the issue date without including the specific proceeds of the deal we are considering. A constant term (not 
reported) is included in all regressions. Z-statistics are based on clustered issuer standard errors. *, **, *** 
Coefficients are statistically significant different than zero at least at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
VARIABLES NON- FINANCIAL BANKS 
Issue Size 0.479*** 0.428*** 
 (0.141) (0.0743) 
Maturity 0.308* 0.543*** 
 (0.176) (0.134) 
Callability 0.0600 -0.592** 
 (0.256) (0.295) 
Investment Grade  0.258 -0.771 
 (0.265) (0.582) 
Nº Tranches 0.356*** -0.313* 
 (0.130) (0.185) 
Total Issue -0.325** -0.141* 
 (0.137) (0.0810) 
Firm Size 0.380*** 0.222** 
 (0.136) (0.112) 
ROA -0.0154 19.06 
 (0.0164) (22.84) 
Debt to Equity -0.00335*** 4.92e-06 
 (0.00116) (7.91e-06) 
Syndicate Size -0.338*** -0.433*** 
 (0.0609) (0.127) 
Finance Vehicle -0.463** 1.262** 
 (0.203) (0.615) 
Past Issuer 0.228* 0.0176 
 (0.166) (0.262) 
Floated Coupon -0.736** (0.295) 
 (0.342) -0.223 
Currency: EUR 0.555 -0.453 
 (0.351) (0.367) 
Currency: GBP 1.280*** 0.564 
 (0.408) (0.543) 
Currency: Other curr. -0.318 -0.118 
 (0.323) (0.327) 
SEC 0.304 0.791 
 (0.554) (0.957) 
Rule144A 1.094*** 0.502* 
 (0.378) (0.468) 
Public Bank  -0.466 
  (0.505) 
Self & Not Self  0.201 
  (0.215) 
Simult. 90days -1.05e-06 2.76e-06 
 (4.38e-06) (2.14e-06) 
   
Year Yes Yes 
Industries Yes Yes 
Countries Yes Yes 
Standard Errors Cluster Issuer Cluster Issuer 
Pseudo R2 0.2667 0.2361 
Log-Likelihood -707.68158 -1054.9436 
p-value (chi2)) 0.00 0.00 
Predicted value 0.35 0.31 
Observations 1,490 2,197 
 
